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vAbstract
This thesis contains a discussion of four problems arising from the application of
stochastic differential equations and real option theory to investment decision prob-
lems in a continuous-time framework. It is based on four papers written jointly with
the author’s supervisor.
In the first problem, we study an evolutionary stock market model in a continuous-
time framework where uncertainty in dividends is produced by a single Wiener process.
The model is an adaptation to a continuous-time framework of a discrete evolutionary
stock market model developed by Evstigneev, Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2006). We
consider the case of fix-mix strategies and derive the stochastic differential equations
which determine the evolution of the wealth processes of the various market players.
The wealth dynamics for various initial setups of the market are simulated.
In the second problem, we apply an entry-exit model in real option theory to study
concessionary agreements between a private company and a state government to
run a privatised business or project. The private company can choose the time to
enter into the agreement and can also choose the time to exit the agreement if the
project becomes unprofitable. An early termination of the agreement by the company
might mean that it has to pay a penalty fee to the government. Optimal times for
the company to enter and exit the agreement are calculated. The dynamics of the
project are assumed to follow either a geometric mean reversion process or geometric
Brownian motion. A comparative analysis is provided. Particular emphasis is given
to the role of uncertainty and how uncertainty affects the average time that the
concessionary agreement is active. The effect of uncertainty is studied by using Monte
Carlo simulation.
vi
In the third problem, we study numerical methods for solving stochastic optimal
control problems which are linear in the control. In particular, we investigate methods
based on spline functions for solving the two-point boundary value problems that
arise from the method of dynamic programming. In the general case, where only
the value function and its first derivative are guaranteed to be continuous, piecewise
quadratic polynomials are used in the solution. However, under certain conditions,
the continuity of the second derivative is also guaranteed. In this case, piecewise
cubic polynomials are used in the solution. We show how the computational time
and memory requirements of the solution algorithm can be improved by effectively
reducing the dimension of the problem. Numerical examples which demonstrate the
effectiveness of our method are provided.
Lastly, we study the situation where, by partial privatisation, a government gives
a private company the opportunity to invest in a government-owned business. After
payment of an initial installment cost, the private company’s investments are assumed
to be flexible within a range [0, k] while the investment in the business continues. We
model the problem in a real option framework and use a geometric mean reversion
process to describe the dynamics of the business. We use the method of dynamic
programming to determine the optimal time for the private company to enter and
pay the initial installment cost as well as the optimal dynamic investment strategy
that it follows afterward. Since an analytic solution cannot be obtained for the
dynamic programming equations, we use quadratic splines to obtain a numerical
solution. Finally we determine the optimal degree of privatisation in our model from
the perspective of the government.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
According to Sullivan and Sheffrin (2002) [72], investment is the commitment of money
or capital to purchase financial instruments or other assets in order to gain profitable
returns in the form of interest, income, or appreciation of the value of the instrument.
An investment involves the choice by an investor, who can be an individual or an
organisation, to place or lend money in a vehicle, instrument or financial asset that
has a certain level of risk and provides the possibility of generating returns over a
period of time. Investment, generally, comes with the risk or uncertainty of the loss
of some or all of the principal sum. There are several types of investments in the
markets, but in this thesis only two types of investment are considered. The first
one is investment in a capital market, e.g., a stock market, and the second one is
investment related to the business of a company or firm.
The first investment we study in this thesis is investment in a stock market in
which an investor invests in financial assets which are expected to provide income or
positive future cash flows. However, there is risk or uncertainty because the value of
the financial assets may increase or decrease in value leading either to capital gains or
1
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losses for the investor. Why consider a stock market? Investing in company shares in
a stock market might be an attractive investment option for those who have money
and want a greater return from it than they would obtain by leaving it in a bank
account. For example, the return from holding a share in a company can be received
both as a dividend or through the increased value of the share. The return from stock
market investment might be appreciably higher than the return from deposit in a bank
account, especially nowadays, when the interest rate is very small (approximately
0.10% to 1.5% for saving accounts in June 20101). Stock markets have a long history.
The first brokers, the Courratiers de Change in France, began operations in the 12th
century. The first share in a company was issued on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange
in 1602 by the Dutch East India Company. In the early 17th century, the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange was also the first stock exchange to introduce continuous trading.
Since then stock markets have become bigger and bigger. There are now stock markets
in virtually every developed country as well as in most developing countries. The total
size of the world stock markets in 2009 was estimated at about 46.6 trillion US dollars2
[78].
One of many questions people who invest in the stock market always ask is “How
do I make money investing?”. In Chapter 2, we aim to help to answer this question by
using a mathematical model to develop strategies for allocating an investment budget
among different available assets.
Another interesting investment we include in this thesis is investment related to
business of a firm. For large firms, there are many different types of business that
1From Interest rate of Instant Access Savings accounts of the Royal Bank of Scotland
2From the annual report “2009 Market Highlights” by World Federation of Exchanges (WFE)
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they find attractive for investment. One of the types of business which we consider
here is investment in a privatised business. In many countries, state governments own
and manage a large number of different businesses. There is no doubt that money is
an important factor the governments need in order to run these businesses. It is not
easy to manage many businesses within limited budgets. In addition, some businesses
are in debt, for example, the local bus services in Bangkok, Thailand. According to its
income statement, the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA), which is the biggest
operator of public transit buses within Bangkok and 5 adjacent provinces, had a loss
of over 950 million Baht in the second quarter of 2010.3 The fact that these businesses
are unsuccessful might be caused by a lack of knowledge and experience in managing
these businesses. To reduce government expenditure and to get more money to spend
in running the businesses, the governments may think of privatisation. Privatisation
is the process of transferring productive operations and assets from the public sector
to the private sector. That is to let the private sector become involved in providing
what might traditionally have been government services and facilities.
Many people who are proponents of privatisation believe that free market compe-
tition between private firms means that the privatised businesses can more efficiently
deliver goods or service than the government. Theoretically, over time this should lead
to lower prices, improved quality, more choices, less corruption, and quicker delivery.
The reason given by the proponents is that governments have few incentives to ensure
that the state-owned enterprises, which are often monopolies, are well run.
Privatisation has been carried out in many developed and developing countries.
For instance, in the UK, [60], [30], privatisation began in the late 1970s. The
3From income statement of BMTA
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Conservative government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher privatised many
government-owned businesses and services. For example, state-owned businesses such
as electricity, telecommunications, oil, gas, etc. were privatised by the Conservative
government. During 1984-1993, the government earned approximately 42 billion
pounds by selling state-owned enterprises to the private sector. As a result, people
have received better service at lower cost. For example, after the privatisation of
British Telecommunications (BT), the cost of telephone calls came down, and waiting
lists for telephones vanished in the early 1980s and never reappeared.
An example of a developing country that introduced privatisation of some gov-
ernment enterprises is Thailand, [34], [76]. Many state-owned enterprises originated
after the Siamese Revolution of 1932 in which the system of government was changed
from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. The number of state-owned
businesses has been steadily increasing since then. The idea of allowing the private
sector to be involved with managing the businesses has been considered by every Thai
government since the 1960s but there were no clear decisons made about privatisation.
The financial crisis in 1997 had a big impact on privatisation in Thailand. One reason
of the crisis was that the Thai government could not defend the Thai baht, which at
that time was pegged to the U.S. dollar at a rate of 25 baht per $1. After the
government eventually decided to float the baht, the baht devalued swiftly and lost
more than half of its value to a rate of 53 baht to the $1. The crisis resulted in the
collapse of many Thai businesses and a heavy burden of foreign debt for Thailand.
In August 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) unveiled a rescue package
for Thailand valued at more than $17 billion, but subject to conditions. Some of the
IMF conditions were the reorganisation and restructuring of state-owned enterprises
by eliminating unnecessary expenditure and by increasing the role of the private
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sector in their management. For that reason, many state-owned enterprises have now
been privatised, e.g., Bangchak Petroleum Public Company Limited, Thai Airways
International Public Company Limited, etc. At the present time, there are still a
number of state-owned enterprises that the government is considering as part of its
privatisation plan.
On the other hand, it has been argued that privatisation is not a good solution for
all countries and that it may bring a nation into a tough situation. For example, in
Argentina, in the 1990s, the government supported free trade and many businesses
such as utilities, energy, transportation, telecommunications, etc. were privatised.
As mentioned above, some of the reasons that have been given for privatisation
are a rise in managing efficiency and an elimination of monopoly and corruption.
Unfortunately, in Argentina, privatisation did not eliminate either corruption or
monopoly. Instead, the corruption and monopoly just switched from the government
to the private companies and eventually resulted in an increase in prices of goods and
services [77]. Joseph Eugene Stiglitz, who is an American economist awarded The
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2001, pointed out that privatisation
without land reform or strong competitive policies resulted in crony capitalism, large
businesses run by organised crime, and a feudal social structure without a middle
class [71].
We have mentioned pros and cons of privatisation. We will not try to go deeply
into the debate of whether privatisation is good or bad for a country. Nevertheless,
what we want to say is that no matter how good or bad privatisation is, if countries
still have privatising plans, or if the IMF still believes that its policies of encouraging
governments to proceed with privatisation are good, then there will be opportunities
that can be considered by private companies for investment in the businesses that a
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government is privatising.
There are different degrees of privatisation that a government can consider, for
example, full or partial privatisation. Full privatisation means that the government
sells all shares of a public business to the private sector which then has complete
responsibility for the management of the business. After a full privatisation of a
business, the business will not be different from a normal private company. In
Thailand, full privatisation has been applied in several sectors of the economy, e.g.,
in a services sector business such as Thailand Post. However, full privatisation is not
ideal for all sectors. In particular, sectors related to natural resources such as coal, oil,
natural gas exploration may not be suitable for full privatisation due to problems of
sovereignty, internal security and monopolisation. In these cases, a government may
be interested in a partial privatisation in which the business ownership is divided into
two parts, government and private. Then, a fraction 0 < α < 1 will be owned by the
private sector while the fraction (1− α) will continue to be held by the government.
In this partial case, a government can obtain money from investment by the private
companies and it can also gain their management expertise. Moreover, the government
is still able to manage the business indirectly because of its (1−α) proportion of right
of ownership. Partial privatisation has been applied in several countries for services
such as electricity and water supply.
In addition to full and partial privatisations, which often have no time limit,
a government also has the possibility of entering into a concessionary agreement
with a private company. In a concessionary agreement, the government allows a
private company to invest and manage a project or business for a fixed period of
time. At the end of the concessionary agreement, the business will be returned to
the government. There are many advantages for a government in entering into a
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concessionary agreement with the private sector for some project or business. First,
the government does not need to spend any government budget on a project. Instead
it can spend its limited budget on other necessary projects. During the concessionary
period, the government does not take any responsibility for the project. So if the
project is not profitable, any debt arising from the project is the responsibility of
the private companies. Moreover, at the end of the concession contract, the right of
ownership falls back to the government.
In Thailand, concessionary agreements have been used in several businesses such as
land, mining or the following example. In 1982, the Expressway and Rapid Transit
Authority of Thailand (ETA) planned to build the Second Stage Expressway System
(SES) with the objective of complementing the First Stage Expressway System. The
new system was designed to reduce traffic congestion in the city centre by acting as
short cuts between the inner city and the outer areas. The ETA, however, was unable
to undertake this project due mostly to financial constraints. As a result, the Thai
government signed a 30-year Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) concession contract in
October 1988 with the Bangkok Expressway Company Limited (BECL). BECL is
headed by the giant Japanese construction firm Kumagai Gumi, which holds a 65%
interest, and the remaining 35% interest is held by local Thai partners. The BOT
means that the private sector receives a concession to finance, build, operate and
collect tolls on the road infrastructure for 30 years. At the end of the contract, the
SES will be turned over to the Thai government at no cost, [11]. In this example,
the concessionary agreement meant that the construction of the SES could go ahead
rather than being stopped due to the financial constraints of the Thai government.
It is clear that governments in many countries cannot afford all of the necessary
or desirable projects in their country. Entering into concessionary agreements with
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private companies is then one way in which these projects can be developed. From
the point of view of private companies, entering into these agreements can be an
attractive form of investment. In this thesis, we study one of the investment problems
that might be faced by a private company considering a concessionary agreement with
a government. We assume that the private company can choose the time to enter into
an agreement and can also choose a time to exit from the agreement by paying an
appropriate penalty fee to the government. The problem then is to choose optimal
times for the private company to enter and exit the concessionary agreement.
In many investment decision-making problems, a firm cannot avoid questions re-
lated to optimal times for doing something. For instance, when should the firm adopt
a particular business? Due to uncertainties about the future, the firm does not know
at the time it takes the decision to adopt a business whether that business will turn
out to be good or bad. After it adopts the business, the questions the firm would then
face are: should the business be extended, expanded, abandoned, or deferred and in
each case what is the optimal time to act? These types of problem are called optimal
stopping time problems. To answer optimal stopping time questions, we need tools
to justify whether a particular time is optimal or not. A traditional tool used for
answering these types of decision-making questions is the Net-Present Value (NPV)
approach. The basic idea of NPV is quite simple. The idea is that if a firm is facing the
question of whether or not it should take an action such as invest, extend or abandon,
then it should calculate the NPV of the business or project under that action. The
NPV is defined as the difference between the present value of the expected stream
of cash that the investment/action will generate and the present value of the stream
of expenditures needed to undertake the project. The rule says that if the NPV is
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greater than zero, the firm should invest.
Even though the NPV is simple and easy to apply; it is often wrong because it
is based on wrong assumptions. In the NPV framework, the investment is assumed
to be either reversible which means that the firm can somehow undo the project
and recover any expenditures made if market conditions turn out to be worse than
expected. Or if it is irreversible, it is now or never proposition which means that if
the firm does not undertake the investment now then it will never be able to do so
in the future. In the NPV approach the flexibility associated with many investments
is ignored. For example, in real situations, if the project turns out to be profitable
after it gets started, then it is usually possible to extend or expand the project. On
the other hand, if the project turns out to be unprofitable or disappointing, then it
can be scaled down or abandoned. In addition, the project usually does not need
to be started immediately, but can be deferred. We can see that the NPV approach
is not suitable for projects in which irreversibility and possibility of delay are very
important.
Another tool that a firm can use when making an investment is based on real option
theory. The real option theory framework includes three major characteristics of most
investment decisions; irreversibility, future uncertainty and timing. When applied to
the investment decision of a firm, the decision to invest can be modelled as a call
option in a financial market. Recall that a financial call option gives the holder the
right, but not the obligation, to buy an asset for a fixed price at a specified time in
the future. When the firm decides to make an investment, it exercises the option.
The option also gives the firm a chance to wait for new information to arrive that
might affect the desirability or timing of any expenditure.
Because of the advantages of real option theory for making investment decisions, we
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apply this technique in this thesis. The application of real option theory to investment
decisions was initially used for making decisions in the non-renewable resources sector,
e.g., in the mining, oil and gas industries etc. In recent years it has been extended to
many other areas, [67].
In this chapter we have discussed investment in capital markets and investment in
privatised businesses and explained their importance in the real world. These two
types of investment are the two main topics of this thesis. In the real world, time is
continuous so it is reasonable to consider investment in a continuous-time framework.
Further, the future is always uncertain. We will use Wiener processes to represent the
uncertainty of an investment in a continuous-time framework. Suitable mathematical
models for describing the dynamics of these uncertain, continuous-time systems are
systems of stochastic differential equations for the relevant variables, e.g., stock prices
for the capital market or the value of the project for privatised businesses.
The thesis is organised as follows. Since stochastic differential equations and real
option theory are the two main mathematical techniques adopted in this thesis, we
include summaries of these two topics in the rest of this chapter. The four following
chapters are based on four papers written jointly with the author’s supervisor, Asso-
ciate Professor Christian-Oliver Ewald. These papers are partly published (see the
references for details of the publications). Chapter 2 contains an evolutionary stock
market model in a continuous-time framework. In this chapter, we adapt a discrete
evolutionary stock market model developed by Evstigneev, Hens and Schenk-Hoppe
[25] into a continuous-time model. We then use the model to investigate the evolution
of the wealth processes of market players for various initial setups of the market. Due
to the complexity of the model, analytic solutions cannot be obtained, but numerical
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simulations for some scenarios are presented.
Chapters 3-5 are applications of real option theory to the investment decisions of
a firm. In Chapter 3, we deal with the entry-exit investment problem. Specifically,
we study the situation where a private company is able to obtain a concession from
the state government to develop a project. The company also has the option to
end the concessionary agreement at any time, for example, if the project becomes
unprofitable. However, if the company ends the agreement prematurely, then it will
have to pay a penalty fee to the government. In this chapter, we aim to answer
two questions. Firstly, when is the optimal time for the company to enter the
concessionary agreement and secondly when is the optimal time to end it? We
discuss two cases for the dynamics of the level of development of the project. In the
first case, the level of development is assumed to follow a geometric mean reversion
process and in the second case it is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion.
We develop a mathematical model as a system of differential equations with free
boundary conditions. We use the shooting method, [48], [10], as a tool to solve our
free boundary problems numerically. A comparative analysis and how uncertainty
affects the average time that the concessionary agreement is active are also carried
out.
In Chapter 4, we present a numerical method based on piecewise-polynomial in-
terpolation, [21], [10], that can be used to solve stochastic optimal control problems
when the model is linear in the control variable. Due to the smooth pasting condition,
only continuity of the first order derivatives is guaranteed. In this case only quadratic
polynomials can be used for the interpolating polynomials. We also show that under
some conditions, the second order derivatives are also continuous. In this case,
cubic polynomials can be used for the interpolating polynomials. We also investigate
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ways in which the numerical method can be improved, for example, by reducing the
computation time required.
In Chapter 5, we apply the numerical method developed in Chapter 4 to the
investment decisions of a firm. In particular, we consider a situation in which a
private company is trying to find an optimal time to invest into a government-owned
business. Then, once the business is adopted, the company wants to find the dynamic
investment strategy which is flexible within a range [0, k] , k > 0 until the business is
completed. In this chapter, we also examine the relationship between the proportion
of a privatised business held by a private company and the expected return of the
government.
In Chapter 6, we summarise our conclusion and discuss future work.
1.1. A Summary of Stochastic Calculus
In this section, we give a summary of the theory and methods of the stochastic
calculus that are relevant for this thesis. There are now many books availabe on
stochastic calculus which can be consulted for further details, for example, Bjork [7],
Øksendal [59], Klebaner [41], Shreve [69], Seydel [68], Gilsing and Shardlow [33] and
McDonald [51].
In 1827, the botanist Robert Brown discovered the process now called Brownian
Motion while he was using a microscope to observe the random motion of pollen
particles floating in water, [41]. In 1900, Louis Bachelier proposed Brownian Motion
(also known as a Wiener Process) as a model for the fluctuations of stock prices.
Nowadays, the Wiener Process is a building block in the construction of models for
markets in a continuous-time framework. In the following, we will begin with basic
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definitions of stochastic calculus and then give a formal definition of a Wiener Process.
We then discuss Stochastic Differential Equations (SDE) which are now used as a
basic model for financial markets. SDE cannot be solved by the methods of classical
calculus, but require the special methods of stochastic calculus. We present the idea of
the Stochastic Integral and then discuss Itoˆ’s lemma which is one of the fundamental
theorems of stochastic calculus. Finally, since it is usually not possible to obtain
analytic solutions of SDEs, we discuss some of the numerical methods that have been
developed to solve SDEs.
A stochastic process (or random process) is a collection of random variables {X(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}.
The possible values of X(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T are called the states of the stochastic process.
Definition 1.1.1. The information generated by X on the interval [0, t], denoted by
FXt , is the collection of events observable through {X(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}.
A stochastic process Y is adapted to the filtration
{FXt }t≥0 if Y (t) ∈ FXt for all t ≥ 0.
Definition 1.1.2. A stochastic process W (t) is called a Wiener process (or Brow-
nian motion) if
• W (0) = 0,
• W (t) is an independent increments process, i.e. if r < s ≤ t < u then W (u) −
W (t) and W (s)−W (r) are independent stochastic variables,
• W (t) − W (s) has a normal distribution with expected value 0 and standard
deviation
√
t− s,
• W (t) is a continuous process.
There are some interesting properties of Wiener processes. First of all, a Wiener
process is a Markov process. This means that the probability distribution of the
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process’ future values depends only on its current value and is independent of the
values in the past. As a result, the current value of the process is the only information
that is needed to make a prediction of future values. The formal definition of Markov
process is given in Definition 1.1.3. Next, even though a Wiener process is continuous
for all times, it is not differentiable at any time. Further, a Wiener process does not
have bounded variation, i.e., a Wiener process can have any real value no matter how
large or how negative that value is.
Definition 1.1.3. X(t) is a Markov process if for any t and s > 0, the conditional
probability distribution of X(t + s) given the history of the process up to time t;
denoted by Ft, is the same as the conditional probability distribution of X(t + s)
given X(t), that is
P [X(t+ s) ≤ y|Ft] = P [X(t+ s) ≤ y|X(t)] . (1.1)
Although a Wiener process can be used as a fundamental building block to set up
many models in financial mathematics, it cannot actually be used itself in a market
model. The reason is that it would predict negative stock prices which do not occur in
the real world. However, by considering functions of Wiener processes, it is possible
to construct a wide class of useful potential models. An Itoˆ process is a generalised
Wiener process which is widely used to represent the dynamics of financial variables,
such as stock prices, value of a project, product prices and other variables that evolve
stochastically over time. The formal definition of an Itoˆ process is as follows.
Definition 1.1.4. An Itoˆ process is a stochastic process X = {X(t), t ≥ 0} that
follows the form
X(t) = X(0) +
∫ t
0
α (s,X(s)) ds+
∫ t
0
σ (s,X(s)) dW (s) ; X(0) = x0, (1.2)
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where α (t,X(t)) is a drift term, σ (t,X(t)) is a diffusion term of the process andW (t)
is a Wiener process. Equation (1.2) is also often written in a differential form as:
dX(t) = α (t,X(t)) dt+ σ (t,X(t)) dW (t) ; X(0) = x0. (1.3)
Equation (1.3) should be regarded as short hand for (1.2). Equation (1.3) does not
have any meaning in the sense of differential equations.
In equation (1.2), the first integral (ds-integral) is the ordinary Riemann Integral
while the second one (dW -integral) is the Itoˆ Integral (or stochastic integral). One
property of a Wiener process W (t) is that it is not differentiable anywhere, so the
classical calculus cannot be used to deal with the dW -integral. Stochastic calculus is
needed. However, before we proceed to an important theorem in stochastic calculus
(Itoˆ’s Formula), we consider the quadratic variation of a Wiener process.
Given an interval [0, t], we divide this interval into n equal subintervals. The
quadratic variation of the Wiener process in this subdivision is defined by
Sn =
n∑
i=1
[
W
(
i
t
n
)
−W
(
(i− 1) t
n
)]2
.
We next use the property of a Wiener process that for fixed times s < t, ∆W =
W (t) −W (s) is normally distributed with expected value 0 and standard deviation
√
t− s. Then from the well-known properties of the normal distribution given by
E [∆W ] = 0,
E
[
(∆W )2
]
= ∆t,
V ar [∆W ] = ∆t,
V ar
[
(∆W )2
]
= 2(∆t)2,
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where ∆t = t− s.
we find that for n→∞,
E [Sn] =
n∑
i=1
E
[[
W
(
i
t
n
)
−W
(
(i− 1) t
n
)]2]
=
n∑
i=1
[
i
t
n
− (i− 1) t
n
]
= t.
Since W (t) has independent increments, we have
V ar [Sn] =
n∑
i=1
V ar
[[
W
(
i
t
n
)
−W
(
(i− 1) t
n
)]2]
=
n∑
i=1
2
[
t2
n2
]
=
2t2
n
.
We see that E [Sn] = t whereas V ar [Sn] → 0 as n → ∞. One can say that as
n→∞, Sn tends to the deterministic limit t. This gives us
∫ t
0
[dW ]2 = t,
or
[dW ]2 = dt.
We will now give Itoˆ’s Formula, which is one of the main results in the theory of
stochastic calculus. Since an Itoˆ process is always used in modelling the financial
market, taking the differentials of such functions can not be avoided. Itoˆ’s Formula
provides a useful result which allows us to differentiate and integrate functions of
stochastic processes.
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Theorem 1.1.1. (Itoˆ’s Formula) Assume that the process X has a stochastic differ-
ential given by
dX(t) = α (t,X(t)) dt+ σ (t,X(t)) dW (t),
where α and σ are adapted processes, and let f (t,X(t)) be a C1,2-function. Then
f (t,X(t)) has a stochastic differential given by
df (t,X(t)) =
∂f
∂t
dt+
∂f
∂x
dX +
1
2
∂2f
∂x2
(dX)2
where we use the following formal multiplication table.
(dt)2 = 0,
dt · dW = 0,
(dW )2 = dt.
An alternative expression is
df (t,X(t)) =
{
∂f
∂t
+ α
∂f
∂x
+
σ2
2
∂2f
∂x2
}
dt+ σ
∂f
∂x
dW (t).
1.1.1. Numerical Methods
Even though SDE is one of the popular tools used to model processes in financial
mathematics, it is extremely rare that one can solve an SDE in some explicit manner.
Therefore, numerical methods must usually be used to solve SDE. At the present
time, it appears that the most efficient and applicable approach to solve SDEs is the
simulation of sample paths of time discrete approximations. See [68], [33] , [37] and
[42] for more details. The approach is as follows. The first step is to discretise the
time interval [0, T ] into a finite number of discrete subintervals. Independent pseudo-
random paths can then be generated on each discrete subinterval by using a Monte
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Carlo approach. The method of generating these simulated paths and the method of
finding a solution of the discretised SDEs are given below.
We can simulate a discretised Wiener process in [0, T ] with ∆t = T
N
, where N is
a number of discretisations, as follows. We let W (j) denote a value of the Wiener
process at tj = j∆t given that the initial value of the process is W (0). Then, we have
W (j) = W (j − 1) + dW (j) ; j = 1, 2, . . . , N ; W (0) = 0, (1.4)
where each dW (j) in Equation (1.4) is an independent random variable of the form
√
∆tN (0, 1). We can use the command randn in MATLAB c© to generate N indepen-
dent pseudorandom numbers from the N (0, 1) distribution. These numbers can then
be used in Equation (1.4) to obtain the dW (j) and W (j) values.
Now let us move to the numerical methods we need to deal with SDE. The sim-
plest discrete-time approximation of an Itoˆ process can be obtained from the Euler-
Maruyama approximation method.
Euler-Maruyama Method
Let X = X(t), t0 ≤ t ≤ T be an Itoˆ process satisfying the SDE
dX(t) = α (t,X(t)) dt+ σ (t,X(t)) dW (t) ; t ∈ [t0, T ], X(t0) = x0 (1.5)
The discrete Euler-Maruyama approximation of X(t) is given by
X(t+∆t) = X(t) + α (t,X(t))∆t+ σ (t,X(t))∆W ; X(t0) = x0;
t = t0, t0 +∆t, . . . , t0 +N∆t = T,
where ∆t = T−t0
N
is the time step and ∆W =W (t+ 1)−W (t).
The Euler-Maruyama method gives strong convergence of order 1
2
. It is possible
to increase the order of convergence by applying the Taylor expansion to the Itoˆ
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formula (a so-called Itoˆ-Taylor expansion). Truncating the Itoˆ-Taylor expansion at an
appropriate point produces the Euler-Milstein Method which gives strong convergence
of order 1.
Euler-Milstein Method
Let X = X(t), t0 ≤ t ≤ T be an Itoˆ process satisfying the SDE (1.5). The discrete
Euler-Milstein approximation is given by
X(t+∆t) = X(t) + α(t,X(t))∆t+ σ(t,X(t))∆W (t)
+
1
2
σ(t,X(t))[σ(t,X(t))]
′
[(∆W (t))2 −∆t].
1.2. A Summary of Real Option Theory
In this section, we present a brief description of investment decision making using
a real option theory approach. For further details of the approach see, e.g., Dixit
and Pindyck [23], Schwartz and Trigeorgis [67]. Our applications of this approach to
investment decision making are given in Chapters 3-5.
Since the pioneer work of Myers (1977) [57], real option theory has been developed
and studied by many authors in the recent financial economic literature. See [67] for
recent contributions. As mentioned earlier, the real option theory approach captures
three major characteristics of investment, namely, irreversibility, future uncertainty
and timing, that are not included in the traditional net present value approach to
investment decision making.
In the real option theory framework, the two techniques widely used to solve
an optimal investment problem are dynamic programming and contingent claims
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analysis. These two techniques are actually quite close to each other even though
they are based on different assumptions about financial markets and the discount
rates which firms use to estimate the present value of future cash flows. Specifically,
in dynamic programming the value of the investment is calculated as the maximum
over all admissible managerial decision strategies of the expected discounted payoffs
that result from the investment. In contingent claim analysis, on the other hand, it is
assumed that there exist traded assets which are perfectly correlated with the state
of the investment. The value of the investment is then calculated from the portfolio
which exactly replicates the corresponding payoffs. In this thesis, we only use the
dynamic programming method to solve problems and therefore we will only give the
details for this method. For details of contingent claims analysis see [23].
The idea of dynamic programming is that the whole sequence of decisions is sep-
arated into two components; the immediate decision, and the value function that
includes the consequences of this immediate decision and all subsequent decisions.
We start with the simplest case, a two-period example.
Let t denote the time. Suppose the agent is facing a problem to decide whether he
should invest in the project today (t = 0) or wait until the next period (t = 1). In
this investment example, the agent has to pay the sunk cost I > 0. Let r ∈ (0, 1) be
the discount rate. Suppose the value of the project at period t = 0 is P0 and that the
value of the project at period t = 1 can either increase to (1 + u)P0 with probability
p or decrease to (1− d)P0 with probability (1− p), i.e.
P1 =


(1 + u)P0 , with probability p
(1− d)P0 , with probability 1− p
.
Let V0 be the expected present value of the revenues the agent gets if he decides to
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invest in period t = 0. After discounting back to period 0, we get
V0 = P0 + [p(1 + u)P0 + (1− p)(1− d)P0]
∞∑
i=1
1
(1 + r)i
=
[
1 + r + p(u+ d)− d
r
]
P0.
The agent will invest if V0 > I so the payoff of the project for the agent is max {V0 − I, 0}.
If the agent does not invest in period t = 0 but postpones it, the expected present
value of the revenues the agent gets if he decides to invest in period t = 1, V1, after
discounting back to period 1 is
V1 = P1
∞∑
i=0
1
(1 + r)i
=
1 + r
r
P1.
As in the previous case, the agent will invest if V1 > I. This leads his expected
payoff to be F1 = max {V1 − I, 0}. However, this payoff is just the value if all future
decisions are optimal. From the perspective of t = 0, the value of the project at
t = 1 is somehow stochastic. Therefore the expectation of this payoff value given all
information at t = 0, called the expected continuation value, must be calculated.
E [F1] = pmax
{
(1 + r)
r
(1 + u)P0 − I, 0
}
+ (1− p)max
{
(1 + r)
r
(1− d)P0 − I, 0
}
.
So in order to make a decision at period t = 0, the agent has to choose whether
he should invest now in which case he will get V0 − I, or not invest now and get the
continuation value, E [F1] discounted back. His net present value at period t = 0,
denoted by F0, will be
F0 = max
{
V0 − I, E [F1]
1 + r
}
. (1.6)
This simple two-period case can be generalised to the many-period case or extended
to the continuous-time framework.
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In general investment problems of an agent, let x be a state variable which can
be a scalar or a vector of any dimension. The current value of x at period t is
denoted by xt and is assumed to be known. The future values of x; xt+1, xt+2, . . . are
stochastic. Our objective, in this thesis, is to consider the continuous-time stochastic
model where uncertainty is driven by a Wiener process. Therefore, since as mentioned
in the previous section, the Wiener process is a Markov process, it is reasonable to
suppose that the state variables are Markov processes.
In the two-period case, at period t = 0, the agent has to decide whether he should
invest or wait until next period t = 1. The choices of the agent at period t are
represented by the control variable ut. Let πt(xt, ut) be the immediate profit flow
of the agent with state value xt and control ut. Suppose the time is finite and is
terminated at T . At the termination, the agent’s payoff is denoted by ST (x(T )). At
each t, the agent will determine the value of the control ut in order to maximise his
expected payoff which is
Ft(xt) = max
ut
{
πt(xt, ut) +
Et [Ft+1(xt+1)]
1 + r
}
. (1.7)
This equation is called the Bellman equation, named after its discoverer, Richard
Bellman.
We can see that the two-period case is a special case of (1.7). At period 0, the agent
has two choices for values of (u0); invest (u0 = 1) or not invest (u0 = 0). Investing
gives a payoff π(x0, 1) = V0−I while waiting will give a discounted continuation value
π(x0, 0) =
E[F1]
1+r
. The optimal decision is to choose the larger value which is exactly
the same as in (1.6).
In the case of a finite time horizon, we know that the payoff at termination is given
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by ST (x(T )). We can, therefore, start at the end and then work backward. This
yields the payoff at time T − 1 as
FT−1(xT−1) = max
uT−1
{
π(xT−1, uT−1) +
ET−1 [ST (x(T ))]
1 + r
}
.
Once the value function at T−1 is determined, we can then solve for the control uT−2,
which leads to the value function FT−2(xT−2) and so on. The procedure is repeated
until F0(x0) is obtained.
On the other hand, if the problem has an infinite time horizon, the problem cannot
be solved backward because we do not know the terminal value. Another similar case
is when the problem is time homogenous. That is the problem has a state variable
x which follows a differential equation which is independent of t explicitly and the
profit π(x, u) is also. We can then write the Bellman equation (1.7) with no explicit
time t. That is
F (x) = max
u
{
π(x, u) +
E [F (x′)|x, u]
1 + r
}
(1.8)
where x denotes the current state and x′ denotes the future state. The expectation in
(1.8) is conditional on the information of the current state x and control u. Since the
terminal payoff is unknown, working backward cannot be used. Fortunately, solving
by an iterative procedure will work in this case. The idea is that we first guess the
value function, say F (1)(x). Then after substituting this value in the right-hand side
of (1.8), the optimal control u can be derived. We then substitute this control back
in (1.8), a new function, call F (2)(x) is obtained. Repeating the procedure, we will
get F (3)(x), F (4)(x), . . . which will converge to the true value function F (x). We do
not need to worry about the initial guess because the convergence of this method is
guaranteed. For further details and the proof of convergence see [23].
The extension to the continuous-time framework can be done by considering the
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limit where the length of the time period (∆t) goes to zero. The actual profit over
the interval time ∆t of the rate of profit flow π(t, x, u) is π(t, x, u)∆t and the discount
factor over the interval ∆t is 1
1+r∆t
. Hence, the Bellman equation (1.8) becomes
F (t, x) = max
u
{
π(t, x, u)∆t+
E [F (t+∆t, x′)|x, u]
1 + r∆t
}
.
Multiplying both sides of this equation by (1 + r∆t), we obtain
(1 + r∆t)F (t, x) = max
u
{π(t, x, u)∆t(1 + r∆t) + E [F (t+∆t, x′)|x, u]} ,
or
r∆tF (t, x) = max
u
{π(t, x, u)∆t(1 + r∆t) + E [F (t+∆t, x′)|x, u]− F (t, x)}
= max
u
{π(t, x, u)∆t(1 + r∆t) + E [∆F ]} .
Dividing both sides by ∆t and letting ∆t go to zero, we obtain
rF (t, x) = max
u
{
π(t, x, u) +
E [dF ]
dt
}
.
We now suppose that the state variable x follows an Itoˆ process which can be
written in the following SDE form
dx(t) = µ(t, x, u)dt+ σ(t, x, u)dW (t)
where W (t) is a Wiener process.
After applying the Itoˆ formula, we find
dF (t, x) =
[
∂
∂t
F (t, x) + µ(t, x, u)
∂
∂x
F (t, x) +
1
2
σ2(t, x, u)
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x)
]
dt
+σ(t, x, u)
∂
∂x
F (t, x)dW (t).
Then, since E [dW ] = 0, we have
E [dF ]
dt
=
∂
∂t
F (t, x) + µ(t, x, u)
∂
∂x
F (t, x) +
1
2
σ2(t, x, u)
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x).
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Finally, the Bellman equation is
rF (t, x) = max
u
{
π(t, x, u) +
∂
∂t
F (t, x)(t, x) + µ(t, x, u)
∂
∂x
F (t, x) +
1
2
σ2(t, x, u)
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x)
}
(1.9)
The way to solve this equation is to first express u as a function of other variables,
i.e.
u = f(t, x,
∂
∂t
F (t, x),
∂
∂x
F (t, x),
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x))
and then to substitute back into the right-hand side of (1.9). This will give a second
order partial differential equation to solve for F (t, x). Note that if the model has an
infinite time horizon or is time homogenous, then the variables; π, µ, σ, do not depend
on t explicitly. This means that the value function is independent of t. Then equation
(1.9) becomes an ordinary differential equation, that is, x is the only independent
variable.
In this thesis, one of the main types of problem we consider is called the optimal
stopping time problem. In general, in this type of problem, the agent has to make
a decision at each time t either to keep his current situation and get the profit flow
π(t, x) or to stop and get the terminal payoff S(t, x). In this optimal stopping time
problem there will be a critical threshold x∗(t) which separates the state space x into
two regions. When x lies on one side of x∗(t) it is optimal for the agent to keep his
current situation while if x lies on the other side then it is optimal to stop. Moreover,
when x = x∗(t), continuing the current situation or stopping gives equal payoffs.
The function x = x∗(t) acts like a border separating F (t, x) and S(t, x). Due to the
assumed continuity of the optimal value function, the following condition, called the
value matching condition, holds at x = x∗(t).
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F (t, x∗(t)) = S(t, x∗(t)) ; ∀t (1.10)
Since our objective is to solve for the optimal threshold x∗(t) and also the value
function F (t, x), it is clear that an extra condition is required in addition to the value
matching condition. An extra condition that can be imposed is called the smooth
pasting condition, which is as shown in (1.11). This condition says that the slope or
the first derivative of both F (t, x) and S(t, x) are equal at the threshold x∗(t).
∂
∂x
F (t, x∗(t)) =
∂
∂x
S(t, x∗(t)) ; ∀t (1.11)
1.2.1. Numerical Methods
When time is continuous, an optimal stopping time problem can be modelled
as partial differential equations in general, or as ordinary differential equations in
some special cases. These special cases are, if there is only a one-dimensional state
variable and that there exists either an infinite time horizon or the problem is time
homogenous. Since it is often impossible to obtain analytic solutions for the dif-
ferential equations, it is usually necessary to use numerical methods. One of the
standard numerical methods that is widely used to solve differential equations is
the Finite Difference (FD) method. The FD method can be used to solve both
Initial-Value Problems (IVP) for ordinary differential equations and Boundary-Value
Problems (BVP) for both ordinary and partial differential equations. For ordinary
differential equations, boundary-value problems can also be solved by a method called
the shooting method which is sometimes simpler to use than the FD method. In this
section, we give a brief idea of the two methods.
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• Finite Difference
The idea of FD for solving differential equations is that we approximate deriva-
tives of functions by finite differences. These approximations change the differential
equations into a set of algebraic equations. A standard method of obtaining finite
difference approximations for derivatives is to use a Taylor series. Under suitable
continuity and differentiability conditions, Taylor’s theorem states that a function
f(x) may be represented as follows
f(x+h) = f(x)+hf ′(x)+
1
2
h2f ′′(x)+
1
6
h3f ′′′(x)+ . . .+
1
n!
hnf (n)(x)+Rn(x) (1.12)
where h denotes the step size of x and Rn(x) is a remainder term. An approximation
for the first order derivative can be obtained by neglecting the term of order h2 and
higher. We obtain
f ′(x) =
f(x+ h)− f(x)
h
+O(h) (1.13)
which is called the forward finite difference formula. There are alternative ways to
approximate the first order derivative. For example, we may also write
f(x−h) = f(x)−hf ′(x)+1
2
h2f ′′(x)−1
6
h3f ′′′(x)+. . .+
1
n!
(−h)nf (n)(x)+Rn(x). (1.14)
Once again, by neglecting the terms of order h2 and higher, the backward finite
difference formula is obtained as
f ′(x) =
f(x)− f(x− h)
h
+O(h). (1.15)
We can see that the truncation errors of both forward and backward FD are of order
O(h). There is another approximation, called the central finite difference formula,
which gives a truncation error of order O(h2). The central FD can be produced by
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subtracting equation (1.14) from equation (1.12) and neglecting order h3 and higher.
We finally get
f ′(x) =
f(x+ h)− f(x− h)
2h
+O(h2). (1.16)
Although the central difference formula has a smaller truncation error than the for-
ward or backward difference formulae, it is not always the best formula to use in a
practical numerical differential equation solver. In practice, each of the three finite
difference formulae are widely used. Each of the three formulae may be used to come
up with efficient numerical schemes, depending on the type of boundary conditions.
The idea of FD can be extended to higher order derivatives. For example, the
second order derivative can be approximated by adding equation (1.12) and equation
(1.14) and neglecting order h3 and higher, which yields
f ′′(x) =
f(x+ h)− 2f(x) + f(x− h)
h2
+O(h2). (1.17)
Numerical methods based on finite difference approximations for partial derivatives
are also widely used to solve partial differential equations and there is an extensive
literature on the subject, see, e.g., Burden and Faires [10] and Brandimarte [8]. In
this thesis, all of the problems that we consider require only the solution of ordi-
nary differential equations. Therefore, we will only give examples of finite difference
approximations for first and second order partial derivatives. For a multi-variable
function f(x, y), let h be the step size of x and k be the step size of y. As for the
one-variable case, the approximations for the first and second order derivatives can
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be obtained from a Taylor series. The formulae for the central FD are
∂
∂x
f(x, y) ≈ f(x+ h, y)− f(x− h, y)
2h
∂
∂y
f(x, y) ≈ f(x, y + k)− f(x, y − k)
2k
∂2
∂x2
f(x, y) ≈ f(x+ h, y)− 2f(x, y) + f(x− h, y)
h2
∂2
∂y2
f(x, y) ≈ f(x, y + k)− 2f(x, y) + f(x, y − k)
k2
∂2
∂y∂x
f(x, y) ≈ f(x+ h, y + k)− f(x+ h, y − k)− f(x− h, y + k) + f(x− h, y − k)
4hk
.
• Shooting Method
In this section, we summarise the main idea of the shooting method. Further details
of the method can be found in Mathews and Fink [48] and Burden and Faires [10].
The shooting method is a numerical method used to solve a Boundary-Value Problem
(BVP) for an ordinary differential equation by solving a set of Initial-Value Problems
(IVP). For a second order differential equation, two conditions are required to define
a solution. For a BVP, these two conditions are given at the two boundary points,
for example, function values may be given at the two points. For an IVP, the two
conditions are usually the function and derivative value at one of the boundary points.
In the shooting method, the known function value at one boundary point can be used
and then an initial guess made for the derivative value at that point. The IVP is
then solved to obtain the function value at the second boundary point. To solve
the IVP any time-stepping numerical methods like Finite Difference can be used.
The function value at the second boundary point is then compared with the required
boundary condition at that point. If the function value at the second point is not
correct, then the guess for the derivative at the first point is systematically adjusted
until the required boundary condition at the second point is satisfied.
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For the case of a nonlinear BVP, the shooting method may require solutions of
many IVPs before an acceptable solution of the BVP is obtained. However, for the
case of a linear BVP, the shooting method gives a closed-form solution of the BVP in
terms of the solutions of only two IVPs as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2.1. Let x(t) be the solution of the following linear BVP
x′′(t) = p(t)x′(t) + q(t)x(t) + r(t) with x(a) = α, x(b) = β. (1.18)
Then x(t) satisfies
x(t) = u(t) +
β − u(b)
v(b)
v(t) (1.19)
where u(t) and v(t) are solutions of the IVPs (1.20) and (1.21) respectively.
u′′(t) = p(t)u′(t) + q(t)u(t) + r(t) with u(a) = α, u′(a) = 0 (1.20)
v′′(t) = p(t)v′(t) + q(t)v(t) with v(a) = 0, v′(a) = 1. (1.21)
Proof Since u(t) and v(t) are solutions of the IVPs (1.20) and (1.21) respectively, the
linear combination
x(t) = u(t) + Cv(t) (1.22)
is a solution of x′′(t) = p(t)x′(t) + q(t)x(t) + r(t) as can be easily seen by
x′′(t) = u′′(t) + Cv′′(t) = p(t)u′(t) + q(t)u(t) + r(t) + p(t)Cv′(t) + q(t)Cv(t)
= p(t) (u′(t) + Cv′(t)) + q(t) (u′(t) + Cv′(t)) + r(t)
= p(t)x′(t) + q(t)x(t) + r(t)
with the boundary values
x(a) = u(a) + Cv(a) = α+ 0 = α
x(b) = u(b) + Cv(b).
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Choosing C = β−u(b)
v(b)
gives x(b) = β. Hence, the solution of (1.18) is
x(t) = u(t) +
β − u(b)
v(b)
v(t) (1.23)
assuming that v(b) 6= 0. 
Chapter 2
Numerical Simulation of a
Diffusion Type Evolutionary Stock
Market Model
According to the expected discounted dividends model, one of the fundamental models
used widely in finance, the rational and fair value of common stocks is given by the
discounted sum of expected future dividends paid out by the company. In this model
it is found that in the long run the trend of stock prices coincides with the trend of
the dividends paid by the companies while the prices can considerably deviate from
their dividend fundamentals over shorter horizons.
In this chapter, we present two stock market models. We start with the discrete-
time evolutionary stock market model set up by Evstigneev, Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´
(2006) [25]. In this model, the authors study a discrete-time model of an incomplete
asset market with a heterogeneous population of portfolio rules. A finite number
of investment rules are used to manage capital by repeated reinvesting in a fixed
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set of long-lived assets. Dividend payments in each period are assumed to follow a
realisation of a stationary Markov process. Moreover, in addition to the exogenous
wealth increases due to the dividends, trading strategies face endogenously determined
capital gains or losses. The trading strategies compete for market capital that is given
by the total value of all assets in each period in time. Using random dynamical systems
theory, they derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the evolutionary stability
of portfolio rules. In case of Markov payoffs, Evstigneev, Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´
discover that the local stability conditions lead to a simple portfolio rule that is the
unique evolutionary stable strategy.
Another model is an adaptation of the first one in a continuous-time framework
where randomness is produced by aWiener process. We set up the model by supposing
that the company pays dividends continuously and the processes in our model are
all of Itoˆ-type. Due to the complexity of the model, the problem cannot be solved
analytically. Even for the derivation of tractable wealth dynamics, severe restriction
on the type of admissible strategies have to be made. We indicate the problem that
arises due to the quadratic variation term stemming from the strategy itself, which
then in principle would lead to a singular optimal control problem. We do not continue
along this line, but instead restrict our investigation to fix-mix strategies which mean
the strategies that are constant in time and state. These strategies have also been
considered in Evstigneev, Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2006) [25] as well as in Yang and
Ewald (2008) [81] and include important cases such as the Merton rule for example.
The results of various numerical simulations and experiments are presented and
discussed. We investigate three different cases relating to different initial wealth
distributions in the simulations. The results vary depending upon the initial market
shares of each trader and the strategies they apply. Our simulations show that in
34 Walailuck Chavanasporn
some cases, one agent can find a dominant strategy that cannot be invaded from
any strategy another agent uses. There are also cases where one investor gains total
market share while the other goes bankrupt. However, there are cases where the
market shares are allocated to each investor equally.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. To start with a summary is
given in Section 2.1 of an evolutionary stock market model in discrete time developed
by Evstigneev, Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ [25]. The model comprises an infinite time
horizon asset market model with long-lived assets and a single perishable consumption
good. Next, in Section 2.2, we modify the model to develop a continuous-time model
in which dividends are paid continuously and all processes are of Itoˆ-type. Since
this model is complicated, analytic solutions cannot be obtained. In Section 2.3, the
results are given of numerical simulations and experiments for this model. Section 2.4
contains a summary and conclusions.
2.1. An Evolutionary Stock Market Model in Discrete Time
In this section, we present a brief review of the evolutionary stock market model
developed by Evstigneev, Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2006) [25]. In [25], the authors
consider an asset market model in discrete time with K ≥ 1 long-lived assets and a
single perishable consumption good. A dividend per share of each asset k = 1, ..., K is
paid at the beginning of every period and before trade takes place in the period. The
total dividend paid to all shareholders of asset k at the beginning of period t is denoted
by Dkt ≥ 0. Dkt depends on the history of states of the world ωt = (..., ω0, ..., ωt) where
ωt ∈ S denotes the states revealed at the beginning of period t. Dividends of assets
are paid in cash and cash is only used to buy consumption goods. There are I ≥ 2
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investors who use portfolio rules denoted by λit(ω
t) =
(
λit,k(ω
t)
)
k=0,...K
with 0 ≤
λit,k(ω
t) ≤ 1 for all k, i = 1, . . . , I and∑Kk=0 λit,k(ωt) = 1. For each k ≥ 1, λit,k(ωt) can
be interpreted as the fraction of the wealth investor i assigns to the purchase of the
risky asset k in period t, whereas λit,0(ω
t) is the fraction of the wealth held in cash.
Investment strategies are assumed to be distinct across investors.
For given portfolio rules λit,k(ω
t) and wealth wit, the units of assets (k = 1, ..., K)
or units of cash (k = 0) that investor i holds at time t can be computed from
θit,k =
λit,k(ω
t) wit
pkt
; k = 0, 1, ..., K. (2.1)
The price pkt is the market clearing price of asset k in period t. The initial supply of
every asset k, sk0, is normalised to 1, and the supply remains constant at any period in
time, i.e. skt = s
k
0. In addition, the supply of cash s
0
t is given by the total dividends of
all assets. Hence, θit,k can be interpreted as the number of all shares issued of asset k
that investor i purchases. The price for cash is normalised to one, i.e. p0t = 1 in every
period t, and is the same as the price of the consumption good. It is also concluded
that the market equilibrium conditions for cash and long-lived assets for any portfolio
holding of agents are
∑I
i=1 θ
i
t,k = s
k
t ; k = 0, 1, ..., K.
Since
∑K
k=0 λ
i
t,k(ω
t) = 1, the budget constraint for investor i in every period t =
0, 1, ... is
K∑
k=0
pkt θ
i
t,k = w
i
t. (2.2)
Due to the fact that the consumption good is perishable; the dynamics of wealth
is affected by dividend payments and capital gains. So the wealth of investor i at the
beginning of period t + 1 and after dividends are paid (before the trade takes place)
is
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wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
(
Dkt+1(ω
t+1) + pkt+1
)
θit,k. (2.3)
From θit,k =
λi
t,k
(ωt) wit
pkt
, and
∑I
i=1 θ
i
t,k = 1 , the market clearing price for the risky
assets (k ≥ 1) can be derived as
pkt =
I∑
i=1
λit,k(ω
t) wit. (2.4)
2.2. An Evolutionary Stock Market Model in Continuous Time
In this section, we develop a continuous-time evolutionary stock market model
by modifying the discrete-time model described in the previous section by assuming
that dividends are paid continuously. Let Dt denote the dividend paid in the period
[t−∆t, t].
In order to adapt the model to continuous time we consider the wealth process and
price process in the limit as time increments go to zero.
The wealth of investor i at the beginning of period t +∆t and after dividends are
paid is
wit+∆t =
K∑
k=1
(
Dkt+∆t(ω
t+∆t) + pkt+∆t
)
θit,k.
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This gives
wit+∆t − wit =
K∑
k=1
[
Dkt+∆t(ω
t+∆t)θit,k + p
k
t+∆tθ
i
t,k −Dkt (ωt)θit−∆t,k − pkt θit−∆t,k
]
=
K∑
k=1
[(
Dkt+∆t(ω
t+∆t)−Dkt (ωt)
)
θit,k +
(
pkt+∆t − pkt
)
θit,k
+
(
Dkt (ω
t) + pkt
)
∆θit,k
]
Letting ∆t go to zero we obtain the following continuous-time interpretation of the
wealth dynamic:
dwit =
K∑
k=1
[(
dDkt (ω
t) + dpkt
)
θit,k +
(
Dkt (ω
t) + pkt
)
dθit,k
]
(2.5)
or alternatively in integrated form
wit =
t∫
0
K∑
k=1
[(
dDks (ω
s) + dpks
)
θis,k +
(
Dks (ω
s) + pks
)
dθis,k
]
. (2.6)
As the θis,k are the choice variables, without further restriction we would formally
obtain some sort of singular stochastic optimal control problem. These problems are
typically very hard to deal with and we will make suitable restrictions to avoid this.
On the other hand, the market clearing price at period t+∆t is
pkt+∆t =
I∑
i=1
λit+∆t,k(ω
t+∆t) wit+∆t
and the increment is given by
pkt+∆t − pkt =
I∑
i=1
[
λit+∆t,k(ω
t+∆t) wit+∆t − λit,k(ωt) wit
]
=
I∑
i=1
[
λit+∆t,k(ω
t+∆t)wit+∆t − λit,k(ωt)wit
+wit+∆tλ
i
t,k(ω
t)− wit+∆tλit,k(ωt)
]
=
I∑
i=1
[
λit,k(ω
t)
(
wit+∆t − wit
)
+ wit+∆t
(
λit+∆t,k(ω
t+∆t)− λit,k(ωt)
)]
.
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Letting ∆t go to zero we obtain the following continuous-time interpretation of the
price dynamic:
dpkt =
I∑
i=1
[
λit,k(ω
t) dwit + w
i
t dλ
i
t,k(ω
t)
]
(2.7)
which can be written in integrated form
pkt =
t∫
0
I∑
i=1
[
λis,k(ω
s) dwis + w
i
s dλ
i
s,k(ω
s)
]
. (2.8)
Here the term dλis,k(ω
s) is worrying, as in a general framework it will produce
unwanted quadratic variation which would potentially lead us out of the class of
diffusion type models. For this reason we restrict our investigations to so-called fix-
mix strategies, which are constant in time and state. This restriction is admittingly
restrictive, on the other hand classical strategies such as the Merton rule and various
fundamentalist strategies do well classify as such. The consequence of this assumption
is that dλit,k(ω
t) = 0. Furthermore, we can write λik = λ
i
t,k(ω
t).
From θit,k =
λi
k
wit
pkt
and pkt =
∑I
i=1 λ
i
kw
i
t, this leads to
θit,k =
λikw
i
t
I∑
i=1
λikw
i
t
. (2.9)
Applying the Itoˆ formula, we get
dθit,k =
∂θit,k
∂wit
dwit +
1
2
∂2θit,k
(∂wit)
2
(dwit)
2
=


(
I∑
i=1
λikw
i
t
)
(λik)− (λikwit)
(
I∑
i=1
λik
)
(
I∑
i=1
λikw
i
t
)2

 dwit
−


{(
I∑
i=1
λikw
i
t
)
(λik)− (λikwit)
(
I∑
i=1
λik
)}(
I∑
i=1
λik
)
(
I∑
i=1
λikw
i
t
)3

 (dwit)2. (2.10)
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Under the assumption dλit,k(ω
t) = 0 and (2.7), we also obtain
dpkt =
I∑
i=1
[
λik(ω
t) dwit
]
. (2.11)
To simplify the following discussion we now consider the special case of two investors
and two assets, one riskless asset, called bond, and one risky asset, called stock. The
assets pay continuous dividends. Hence, in the model, there are two dividend pro-
cesses, two wealth processes and two price processes. We suppose that the processes
are in the form of Itoˆ-type. The two price processes satisfy
dpkt =
2∑
i=1
[
λik dw
i
t
]
; k = 1, 2,
and therefore
pkt =
2∑
i=1
[
λik w
i
t
]
; k = 1, 2.
The dividend processes of the bond and stock are given by
dD1t = rdt
and
dD2t = αD
2
t dt+ σD
2
t dB(t)
where B(t) denotes the standard Brownian Motion.
In the following we derive the stochastic differential equations which characterise
the evolution of the wealth of the two investors. We assume that they are of diffusion-
type, which means they can be written in the following form
dw1t = β
1
1(wt, λk)dt+ β
1
2(wt, λk)dB(t)
and
dw2t = β
2
1(wt, λk)dt+ β
2
2(wt, λk)dB(t)
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with wt = (w
1
t , w
2
t ) and λk = (λ
1
k, λ
2
k). We will identify the unknown functions
β11 , β
1
2 , β
2
1 and β
2
2 by comparison with (2.5), using (2.10) and (2.11).
From the form of wealth processes we have set up and the Itoˆ formula, we can
see that (dwit)
2 = (βi2)
2
dt. After substituting for dDkt , dp
k
t , dw
i
t, and dθ
i
t,k using the
previous relation for (dwit)
2in the wealth processes (2.5) and rearrange the equations,
we obtain the following four equations to be solved for β11 , β
1
2 , β
2
1 and β
2
2 .
β11 = r
(
λ11w
1
t
λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)
+
(
λ11β
1
1 + λ
2
1β
2
1
)( λ11w1t
λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)
(2.12)
+
[(
D1t + λ
1
1w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)((λ11w1t + λ21w2t ) (λ11)− (λ11w1t )(λ11 + λ21)
(λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t )
2
)
(
β11 −
(β12)
2(λ11 + λ
2
1)
λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)]
+αD2t
(
λ12w
1
t
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)
+
(
λ12β
1
1 + λ
2
2β
2
1
)( λ12w1t
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)
+
[(
D2t + λ
1
2w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)((λ12w1t + λ22w2t ) (λ12)− (λ12w1t )(λ12 + λ22)
(λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t )
2
)
(
β11 −
(β12)
2(λ12 + λ
2
2)
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)]
β21 = r
(
λ21w
2
t
λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)
+
(
λ11β
1
1 + λ
2
1β
2
1
)( λ21w2t
λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)
(2.13)
+
[(
D1t + λ
1
1w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)((λ11w1t + λ21w2t ) (λ21)− (λ21w2t )(λ11 + λ21)
(λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t )
2
)
(
β21 −
(β22)
2(λ11 + λ
2
1)
λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)]
+αD2t
(
λ22w
2
t
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)
+
(
λ12β
1
1 + λ
2
2β
2
1
)( λ22w2t
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)
+
[(
D2t + λ
1
2w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)((λ12w1t + λ22w2t ) (λ22)− (λ22w2t )(λ12 + λ22)
(λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t )
2
)
(
β21 −
(β22)
2(λ12 + λ
2
2)
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)]
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β12 =
(
λ11β
1
2 + λ
2
1β
2
2
)( λ11w1t
λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)
(2.14)
+
(
D1t + λ
1
1w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
) [(λ11w1t + λ21w2t ) (λ11)− (λ11w1t )(λ11 + λ21)
(λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t )
2
]
β12
+σD2t
(
λ12w
1
t
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)
+
(
λ12β
1
2 + λ
2
2β
2
2
)( λ12w1t
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)
+
(
D2t + λ
1
2w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
) [(λ12w1t + λ22w2t ) (λ12)− (λ12w1t )(λ12 + λ22)
(λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t )
2
]
β12
β22 =
(
λ11β
1
2 + λ
2
1β
2
2
)( λ21w2t
λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)
(2.15)
+
(
D1t + λ
1
1w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
) [(λ11w1t + λ21w2t ) (λ21)− (λ21w2t )(λ11 + λ21)
(λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t )
2
]
β22
+σD2t
(
λ22w
2
t
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)
+
(
λ12β
1
2 + λ
2
2β
2
2
)( λ22w2t
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)
+
(
D2t + λ
1
2w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
) [(λ12w1t + λ22w2t ) (λ22)− (λ22w2t )(λ12 + λ22)
(λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t )
2
]
β22
Before solving for all unknown functions, we impose one assumption. It is clear that
the smaller the consumption rate, the higher the growth rate of wealth. Therefore,
in the following we assume that all investors have the same rate of consumption,
i.e. λi0(ω
t) = λ0(ω
t). This assumption is made in order to make the study unbiased
between investors with high and low saving rates. In fact this assumption has also
been made in Evstigneev, Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2006) [25] and Yang and Ewald
(2008) [81].
First, we solve for β12 and β
2
2 from (2.14) and (2.15).
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β12 + β
2
2 =
(
λ11β
1
2 + λ
2
1β
2
2
)(λ11w1t + λ21w2t
λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
)
+
(D1t + λ
1
1w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t ) (λ
1
1λ
2
1)(w
1
t − w2t )(β22 − β12)
(λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t )
2
+σD2t
(
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)
+
(
λ12β
1
2 + λ
2
2β
2
2
)(λ12w1t + λ22w2t
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
)
+
(D2t + λ
1
2w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t ) (λ
1
2λ
2
2)(w
1
t − w2t )(β22 − β12)
(λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t )
2
By using Pk = λ
1
kw
1
t + λ
2
kw
2
t , W = w
1
t − w2t , Ak = λ1kλ2k D
k
t +Pk
(Pk)
2 and A = A1 + A2,
we get
β12 + β
2
2 =
[(
λ11 + λ
1
2
)−WA]β12 + [(λ21 + λ22)+WA] β22 + σD2t .
This leads to
β22 =
WA+ λ0
WA− λ0β
1
2 −
σD2t
WA− λ0 . (2.16)
Inserting (2.16) in (2.14) yields
β12 =
(
λ11λ
2
1w
1
t
P1
+
λ12λ
2
2w
1
t
P2
)[
WA+ λ0
WA− λ0β
1
2 −
σD2t
WA− λ0
]
+
(λ11)
2w1t
P1
β12 +
(λ12)
2w1t
P2
β12 −
D1t + P1
(P1)2
(λ11λ
2
1)(w
1
t − w2t )β12
−D
2
t + P2
(P2)2
(λ12λ
2
2)(w
1
t − w2t )β12 + σD2t
λ12w
1
t
P2
.
That is
β12 =
σD2tw
1
t
(
λ1
2
P2
− C
WA−λ0
)
1− w1tC
(
WA+λ0
WA−λ0
)
− w1t
(
(λ11)
2
P1
+
(λ12)
2
P2
)
+WA
(2.17)
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where C =
λ1
1
λ2
1
P1
+
λ1
2
λ2
2
P2
.
Next, using (2.12) and (2.13), we solve for β11 and β
2
1 .
β11 + β
2
1 = r
(
λ11w
1
t + λ
2
1w
2
t
P1
)
+ αD2t
(
λ12w
1
t + λ
2
2w
2
t
P2
)
+
(
λ11β
1
1 + λ
2
1β
2
1
)(λ11w1t + λ21w2t
P1
)
+
(
λ12β
1
1 + λ
2
2β
2
1
)(λ12w1t + λ22w2t
P2
)
+
(D1t + P1) (λ
1
1λ
2
1)(w
1
t − w2t )
(P1)
2
[
(β21 − β11)−
{
(β22)
2 − (β12)2
}(λ11 + λ21
P1
)]
+
(D2t + P2) (λ
1
2λ
2
2)(w
1
t − w2t )
(P2)
2
[
(β21 − β11)−
{
(β22)
2 − (β12)2
}(λ12 + λ22
P2
)]
β11 + β
2
1 = r + αD
2
t + (λ
1
1 + λ
1
2)β
1
1 + (λ
2
1 + λ
2
2)β
2
1 +W (A
1 + A2)(β21 − β11)
−W
[
A1(λ11 + λ
2
1)
P1
+
A2(λ12 + λ
2
2)
P2
] [
(β22)
2 − (β12)2
]
β21 =
(
WA+ λ0
WA− λ0
)
β11 +
W (A1E1 + A2E2)
WA− λ0
[
(β22)
2 − (β12)2
]
(2.18)
− r
WA− λ0 −
αD2t
WA− λ0
where Ek =
λ1
k
+λ2
k
Pk
.
Finally,
β11 =
1
1− w1tC
(
WA+λ0
WA−λ0
)
− w1t
(
(λ11)
2
P1
+
(λ12)
2
P2
)
+WA
(2.19)
[
w1tC
WA− λ0{W (A
1E1 + A2E2)
[
(β22)
2 − (β12)2
]− r − αD2t }
+r
(
λ11w
1
t
P1
)
+ αD2t
(
λ12w
1
t
P2
)
+W (A1E1 + A2E2)(β12)
2
]
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The solutions for β11 , β
1
2 , β
2
1 and β
2
2 are shown in (2.19), (2.17), (2.18) and (2.16).
We can see that once β12 is determined, β
2
2 , β
1
1 and β
2
1 can be found respectively.
It is obvious that the complexity of the equations forbids an analytical solution
to the wealth dynamics. Therefore numerical simulations are given in the following
section.
2.3. Numerical Simulations and Experiments
This section is devoted to discussing numerical simulations and experiments on the
continuous evolutionary stock market model given in the previous section.
Analytic solutions for the two dividend processes dD1t = rdt and dD
2
t = αD
2
t dt +
σD2t dB(t) with the initial conditions D
1
0 = 0 and D
2
0 = 1 are
D1t = rt
and
D2t = exp
(
(α− σ
2
2
)t+ σB(t)
)
.
Due to the complexity of β11 , β
1
2 , β
2
1 and β
2
2 shown in (2.16) – (2.19), the stochastic
differential equations (SDE) of the wealth processes
dw1t = β
1
1(wt, λk)dt+ β
1
2(wt, λk)dB(t)
and
dw2t = β
2
1(wt, λk)dt+ β
2
2(wt, λk)dB(t)
cannot be solved analytically. We used the MATLAB c© software to simulate the
Brownian Motion and find the numerical solutions of these SDEs. The details of the
simulation method for the Brownian Motion paths can be found in Chapter 1, Section
1.1.1.
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For the purpose of illustration, the following parameter values are chosen for the
simulations. In the dividend processes; the interest rate (r) is set to 7% while α and σ
are set to 0.07 and 0.2 respectively. The consumption rate (λ0) is set equal to 0.1. In
the simulations, we explore three scenarios depending on the initial wealth of the two
investors w10 and w
2
0. In the first case, we simulate with the initial wealth of the two
investors assumed to be equal, that is w10 = w
2
0 = 1. In the second case, the initial
wealth of the first investor is assumed to be smaller than that of the second one, say
w10 = 1 and w
2
0 = 2. Finally, the initial wealth of the first investor is assumed to be
greater than that of the second one; we use w10 = 1 and w
2
0 = 0.6.
In each case, we evaluate the market share of each investor by
rit =
wit
I∑
i=1
wit
with the different portfolio rules of both investors. By fixing λ11, the proportion of
wealth investor 1 invests in the bond, we plot the market shares of the investors
corresponding to λ21; the proportion of wealth investor 2 invests in bond, which
increases by 0.1 from 0 to 1 − λ0. Note that we do not consider the case when
λ11 = λ
2
1 = 0 and λ
1
1 = λ
2
1 = 1−λ0 because both of them lead to pkt = 0. The results of
the simulation in three scenarios are demonstrated in Figure 2.1 - Figure 2.6. Figure
2.1 - Figure 2.2 show the simulation results of the first scenario, Figure 2.3 - Figure
2.4 contain the simulation of the second scenario and finally the results of the third
scenario are illustrated in Figure 2.5 - Figure 2.6. In all Figures, the dashed line (- -
-) denotes r1t ; the market share of the first investor, and the line with asterisk (-*-)
represents r2t ; the market share of the second one. The summaries of the simulation
are as follows.
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For the first scenario, the initial wealth of the two investors are equal, w10 = w
2
0 = 1;
that is (r10, r
2
0) = (0.5, 0.5), and then our simulations show that if the investor invests
his total investment money in stock, λi1 = 0, another investor dominates the market
for all his strategies. (Recall that there is not a case that both investors invest all their
money either in bond or stock.) In addition, if both agents use the same strategies,
their market shares will not be different. That is both r1T and r
2
T remain at 0.5. We
can interpret this result to mean that the agent will dominate the market if he invests
more in bonds than another agent. However, for all strategies of both investors we
have tried, there is not a case where any investor can obtain total market share.
The maximum of market share that one investor can reach is around 0.7. It means
that if both investors start with the same amount of money, it does not matter what
strategies they use, they both survive in the market. The ten cases of the simulation,
λ11 = 0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, can be found in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2.
In the second scenario; Figure 2.3 - Figure 2.4, in which we consider the initial
wealth of the first investor is less than the second one, w10 = 1 and w
2
0 = 2; that is
(r10, r
2
0) = (0.3333, 0.6667), we found from the simulations that the second investor
dominates the market for all cases of the first investor’s strategies, except the case
when λ11 = 0.9 and λ
2
1 = 0 as can be seen in Figure 2.4(f). This is the case that the
first agent invests all his money in the bond while the second agent invests all his
money in stock. If this case happens, the market shares of both investors are quite
similar (in fact r1T and r
2
T are close to 0.5). The best strategy of the second trader is
to invest all his budget in bonds (λ21 = 0.9), because this strategy leads him to gain
more market share than another no matter what the first investor’s strategies are. In
addition, for all λ11 and 0 ≤ λ21 ≤ 0.8, the market shares are changed in small intervals.
Figure 2.3 - Figure 2.4 show the results in the third scenario in which the first
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agent starts with more wealth than another agent, say w10 = 1 and w
2
0 = 0.6, that is,
(r10, r
2
0) = (0.625, 0.375). The simulation illustrates that the first agent dominates the
market for all strategies of the second agent, except two cases which are (λ11, λ
2
1) =
(0, 0.9); which is the case when the first agent invests all his money in stock while the
second one invests all his money in bond; and (0.1, 0.9) which means that the first
agent puts 10% of his money in bond and invests the rest in stock whereas another
agent invests his total money in bond. In the first case; Figure 2.5(a), the agent 2
dominates the market while another case; Figure 2.5(b), both agents’ market shares
are similar (r1T and r
2
T and are close to 0.5). This scenario seems to be in opposition
to the second scenario, the difference is, there are some portfolio rules which lead
agent 1 to obtain a whole market share and agent 2 going bankrupt in the market;
i.e. (r1T , r
2
T ) is close to (1, 0). For the second agent; the higher λ
2
1, the higher r
2
T . In
most cases, r2T is maximal when λ
2
1 = 0.9 except only one case when λ
1
1 is also equal
to 0.9. If λ11 = 0.9, maximum r
2
T comes from λ
2
1 = 0.
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Figure 2.1: The first Scenario
(
w10, w
2
0
)
= (1, 1) when λ11 = 0 to λ
1
1 = 0.3
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Figure 2.2: The first Scenario
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= (1, 1) (Cont.) when λ11 = 0.4 to λ
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1 = 0.9
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Figure 2.3: The second Scenario
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Figure 2.4: The second Scenario
(
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= (1, 2) (Cont.) when λ11 = 0.4 to λ
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1 = 0.9
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Figure 2.5: The third Scenario
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2.4. Conclusions
In this chapter, we have adapted the discrete evolutionary stock market model set
up by Evstigneev, Hens, Schenk-Hoppe´ (2006) [25] to a continuous-time framework,
where uncertainty in dividends is produced by a single Wiener process. The setup
is therefore significantly different from that of Yang and Ewald (2008) [81], who
also study continuous time, but remain within the framework of random dynamical
systems of non-diffusive type. We have restricted our investigations to the case of
fix-mix strategies which are constant in time and state. For the case of fix-mix
strategies we have derived the stochastic differential equation which determines the
evolution of the wealth processes of the various market players. These stochastic
differential equations are highly non-linear and we find that it is impossible to solve
them analytically. Instead we simulate the wealth dynamic for various initial setups
of the market. We do the experiment for three different cases of initial wealth which
are (w1t , w
2
t ) = (1, 1), (1, 2) and (1, 0.6) respectively. Under a given set of parameter
values, the simulations show that in some cases, one agent is able to find dominant
strategies while in some cases the market shares are divided among the two investors
equally. In addition, in some cases one agent gains the whole market share while
another one dies out of the market.
Chapter 3
Development under a
Concessionary Agreement: A Real
Option Approach
In many countries, Thailand, China, Australia and Russia, for example, many sectors
of the economy are or have initially been state owned. Such sectors include but are
not limited to natural resources, land, infrastructure, and services such as the postal
service or transportation services etc. In recent years, in particular in the services
sector, full privatisation has been introduced in a number of countries. However, for
other sectors, for example, in natural resources such as coal, oil or nuclear energy, it
may not be ideal for the state to proceed to full privatisation. The reason is that, in the
cases mentioned, the states sovereignty or security may be endangered. On the other
hand, private companies may have developed great expertise and efficiency in under-
taking projects in specific sectors that are relevant for the state-economy, for example,
in oil/petroleum exploration. In addition, the state budget may not be sufficient to
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allow investment in all projects that are regarded as important for the development
of the country. For example, in the case of Thailand, the government of Thailand has
had many construction plans for building inter-city roads and expressways in order
to reduce traffic congestion in the city centres. The government, however, has been
unable to undertake all of these projects due mostly to financial constraints. In these
cases it may be worthwhile for the state government to give a concession to a private
company to develop a specific project. This concession might be set to end at a
given date in the future, or the private company might be given an option to end
the concession prematurely by paying an appropriate penalty fee to the government.
When the concession has ended, all property rights will usually revert back to the
state and a new concession can be awarded. In this chapter we study the situation,
where the concession will not be awarded again to the same private company if that
company ended the previous concession prematurely. This assumption is realistic in
many cases where private companies compete for state concessions.
Entry-exit models in the real option context have been discussed by many authors,
see for example Mossin (1968) [56], Brennan and Schwartz (1985) [9], Dixit (1989)
[22] and Sodal (2006) [70]. These authors answer the question when it is optimal
for companies to switch between invest (enter the market) and abandon (exit the
market). In these models companies do not lose the right to invest again if they
abandon operation. Our model is different from these previous entry-exit models, in
the way that we do not allow for re-entry after premature termination of an agreement.
This condition is realistic under the assumptions indicated above. Moreover, we make
use of exponential utility for modelling the benefits of the private company when
undertaking the project.
Mathematically, we model the level of development of a project, denoted by x(t),
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in two different ways. In the first case, we assume that the level follows a geometric
mean reversion process, while in the second case we assume it follows a geometric
Brownian motion. From the point of dynamics, these are standard assumptions in
real option theory. Technically, in geometric mean reversion models it is assumed
that in the long term the level fluctuates about a so-called mean reversion level θ.
In this case the level will have bounded variance and its expectation will converge
to a limiting value, which is the mean reversion level minus some expectation bias,
see Ewald and Yang (2007) [27]. This is a good modelling assumption in the case
of renewable resources. Geometric Brownian motion, on the other hand, shows an
exponential growth in expectation and its variance will eventually become arbitrarily
large. Both geometric mean reversion and geometric Brownian motion models have
the property that if the level of x(t) ever falls to zero, then it would always remain
zero. This situation can be interpreted as meaning that the company is bankrupt.
The level of development x(t) does not necessarily have to be a monetary value.
For example, it could be the level of industrialisation, or the percentage of households
that have access to modern hospital treatment. In our models, we assume that a
private company with a state concession will accumulate utility measured in terms of
a utility function F1(x(t)), which measures benefits against costs.
Most of the classical real option models in the literature, including those mentioned
above, do not allow for a fully analytic solution. In the classical cases, it is possible to
analytically compute the solution of the dynamic programming equations that appear
in the models. However, it is usually not possible to obtain an analytic solution for the
threshold level for investment and therefore this level must be computed numerically.
In our model, we are not able to solve the dynamic programming equation analytically,
at least not for the part that corresponds to the period in which the private company is
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developing the project. The main reasons are that our models do not allow for re-entry
and that they have a more complex utility function than the classical models. In our
models, the dynamic programming equations lead to free boundary value problems
which must be solved numerically. We use a method called a “shooting method”
to obtain numerical solutions for these free boundary value problems. A detailed
discussion of the numerical results, including a thorough comparative analysis, is
provided in this chapter.
The relationship between uncertainty and the expected time the private company
develops the project under the concessionary agreement is an interesting aspect for
both the state and the private company. In real option models the relationship be-
tween uncertainty and investment has been frequently discussed, see, e.g., McDonald
and Siegel (1986) [52], Dixit (1989) [22], Mauer and Ott (1995) [50] as well as Metcalf
and Hassett (1995) [54] for example. They find that a rise in uncertainty leads to a
larger critical value as the real option increases in price and it becomes more profitable
to hold on to the option. However, Sarkar (2000) [66] argues that the relationship
between uncertainty and investment is not necessarily expressed in the relationship
between volatility and threshold. An increase in volatility may force the threshold to
be higher, but the time to reach this higher threshold might be shorter and therefore
the time to undertake the investment could also be shorter. Instead Sarkar proposed
to study the expected time that passes until investment is undertaken in terms of the
level of uncertainty. We will discuss both of these aspects in this chapter. In different
to Sarkar (2000) [66], who studies an investment problem at a single time, we are
facing two times, τ1, when the private company enters the concessionary agreement,
and τ2, when the private company ends it. Our focus will be on the expected time
E [τ2 − τ1] for which the private company is developing the project.
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.1, we set up
our single entry-exit model for the cases where the level of development follows either
geometric mean reversion or geometric Brownian motion. In Section 3.2 we discuss
the method of solution of the models. In Section 3.3 we show the numerical results
and give a discussion of them. The section includes a detailed comparative analysis.
Finally, in Section 3.4 we summarise conclusions.
3.1. Model Setup
As indicated earlier we study the situation where a project is initially developed by
the state. The state then enters a concessionary agreement with a private company
to continue the development of the project. The private company is allowed to end
the agreement at any time under payment of a penalty fee. In addition, the private
company will be barred from obtaining a concession at a later date for that same
project. The two main questions for the private company are what is the optimal
time to enter the concessionary agreement and what is the optimal time to end it.
These questions naturally lead to a two-stage real option problem which we will set
up below. We will denote the level of the project at time t by x(t).
3.1.1. The Case of Geometric Mean Reversion
In this section, we describe the model where the level of development follows
geometric mean reversion. In this case the dynamic optimisation problem of the
private company is given as
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V (x) = max
τ1<τ2
E
[(∫ τ2
τ1
e−rtF1(x(t))dt+ e
−rτ2 (S(x(τ2))− Iq)
)
− e−rτ1Is
∣∣∣∣ x(0) = x0
]
(3.1)
subject to
dx(t) = (α− δx(t))x(t)dt+ σx(t)dW (t) for t ≤ τ1 (3.2)
dx(t) = (µ− δx(t))x(t)dt+ σx(t)dW (t) for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2. (3.3)
The interpretation of this is as follows. Before the company invests in the project at
time τ1 the dynamics of the level of the project, dx(t), follows (3.2). During that period
the development is entirely undertaken by the state government. The parameter α
represents the government contribution to the project and δ is the depreciation rate.
We assume α > δ > 0. The parameter σ > 0 denotes the volatility and W (t)
stands for a standard Wiener process. Once the private company decides to enter
the concessionary agreement at time τ1, the company needs to pay a fee Is > 0 to
the government. In addition, the dynamics of the development level changes, due to
the private company now running the business. We assume that x(t) then follows
the dynamics (3.3) until time τ2 at which the private company decides to end the
concessionary agreement. At that time the dynamics would go back to (3.2), but
as the private company does not earn and in fact will never again earn any benefits
from the project, this fact does not contribute to the private company’s optimisation
problem. Between time τ1 and τ2 the parameter µ represents the private company
contribution to the project and F1(x(t)) stands for the utility that the private company
obtains from the development. At the time the private company decides to end the
concessionary agreement, it will give the initial capital back to the government, but
will be reimbursed S(x(τ2)) for the development undertaken, e.g., for factory buildings
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that have been erected on state owned land etc. Additionally the private company
will have to pay a penalty fee of Iq.
We will solve the dynamic optimisation problem (3.1)-(3.3) backward in time as
this is standard in multi-stage real option problems. Let V0(x) and V1(x) denote the
value functions of the corresponding dynamic optimisation problems before τ1 and
in between τ1 and τ2. After the private company ends the concessionary agreement,
it will obtain a terminal payoff of S(x(τ2)) − Iq, but there will be no option value
left. Note that V (x) = V0(x) and this function includes the combined option value,
the one to enter and the one to exit, while V1(x) only includes the option value
of exiting. It follows from standard real option theory that the private company
will enter the concessionary agreement when a certain investment threshold x∗s is
reached. At this threshold the so-called value matching condition (3.4) and smooth
pasting condition (3.5) need to be satisfied. Furthermore, the company will end the
concessionary agreement when another investment threshold x∗q is reached at which
the value matching condition (3.6) and smooth pasting condition (3.7) apply.
V0(x
∗
s) = V1(x
∗
s)− Is (3.4)
(V0(x
∗
s))
′
= (V1(x
∗
s))
′
(3.5)
V1(x
∗
q) = S(x
∗
q)− Iq (3.6)
(
V1(x
∗
q)
)′
=
(
S(x∗q)
)′
(3.7)
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3.1.2. The Case of Geometric Brownian Motion
This section contains an alternative way to setup our optimisation problem based
on Brownian motion. The private company aims to maximise (3.1) subject to
dx(t) = αx(t)dt+ σx(t)dW (t) ; t ≤ τ1 (3.8)
dx(t) = µx(t)dt+ σx(t)dW (t) ; τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2 (3.9)
The parameters α, µ and σ are interpreted in the same way as before. Note that
there is no depreciation here, and in fact (3.8) and (3.9) are special cases of (3.2) and
(3.3) for δ = 0. The analysis however is different from the case δ 6= 0 which is why
we include it as a separate case here.
3.2. Solving the Problem
In this section we derive the differential equations that will determine the solutions
of the two optimisation problems (3.1)-(3.3) and (3.1), (3.8)-(3.9) and then discuss how
to solve them with a combination of numerical and analytical methods. As mentioned
earlier, we proceed backward in time. In the first step, we have to find V1(x) and x
∗
q
which are the value function of the private company after the company enter the
concessionary agreement and the optimal threshold for ending the agreement. Once
V1(x) is determined, we will solve for V0(x) and x
∗
s which denote the value function of
the private company before it decides to enter the concessionary agreement and the
optimal threshold for entering the agreement.
In our model, we use linear costs and an exponential utility function to measure the
benefits that accrue with the level of the development x(t). The total utility function
is then of the type F1(x(t)) = (1− exp(−λx(t))) − µx(t). For simplicity we assume
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that the terminal payoff for the private company is given as S(x(t)) = x(t).
3.2.1. The Case of Geometric Mean Reversion
The equations (3.2) and (3.3) are of the geometric mean reversion type which is
well understood and its moments have been derived in Ewald and Yang (2007) [27],
for example. Mathematically, the dynamics of (3.2) and (3.3) are tied to the mean
reversion levels α
δ
and µ
δ
, respectively. The parameter δ captures how fast the value
of x(t) reacts to the disturbance from the mean level.
We start with solving the problem for V1(x) and x
∗
q, τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2 by using the
constraint (3.3) with the two free boundary conditions (3.6) and (3.7). Using the
specific forms for F1(x(t)) and S(x(t)), the corresponding Bellman equation becomes
rV1 = (µ− δx)xV ′1 +
1
2
σ2x2V ′′1 + 1− exp(−λx)− µx, (3.10)
subject to the following two conditions
V1(x
∗
q) = x
∗
q − Iq (3.11)
(
V1(x
∗
q)
)′
= 1. (3.12)
We will solve (3.10) subject to (3.11) and (3.12) numerically. In order to do that,
an additional boundary condition is needed. This condition, which applies for both
geometric mean reversion and geometric Brownian motion, comes from the fact that
x(t) = 0 is a fixed point of the dynamics (3.2), (3.3), (3.8) and (3.9). It states
V1(0) = 0. (3.13)
The idea for solving the free boundary problem numerically is as follows. We
first make a guess that the optimal threshold x∗q is xˆ, and then apply the shooting
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method to solve the boundary value problem (3.10) subject to (3.13) and (3.11). We
then check whether the solution xˆ satisfies (3.12) within a certain specified level of
tolerance. If xˆ does not satisfy (3.12), we change xˆ to xˆ+ ǫ where ǫ is a small number.
This procedure is repeated until an approximation to the solution x∗q is found. Details
of the shooting method can be found in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1.
Once V1(x) is determined, we will then solve for V0(x) and x
∗
s, t < τ1, by using the
constraint (3.2) with the two free boundary conditions (3.4) and (3.5). The Bellman
equation for this problem is
rV0 = (α− δx)xV ′0 +
1
2
σ2x2V ′′0 . (3.14)
One way to derive the general form of the value function before τ1 is to assume an
elementary solution for (3.14) of the form
V0(x) = Ax
βh(x),
where h(x) is a function to be determined. By substitution in (3.14) and after
rearranging terms, we obtain
xβh(x)
[
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − r
]
+xβ+1
[
1
2
σ2xh′′(x) + (α− δx+ σ2β)h′(x)− βδh(x)
]
= 0. (3.15)
Equation (3.15) needs to hold for all values of x, therefore the coefficients for both
xβh(x) and xβ+1 must be equal to zero. From the first term of (3.15), we get
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − r = 0
which has two roots
β1 =
−(α− 1
2
σ2) +
√
(α− 1
2
σ2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
(3.16)
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β2 =
−(α− 1
2
σ2)−
√
(α− 1
2
σ2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
. (3.17)
This leads to
V0(x) = A1x
β1h1(x) + A2x
β2h2(x)
with hi(x); i = 1, 2 satisfying
1
2
σ2xh′′i (x) + (α− δx+ σ2βi)h′i(x)− βiδhi(x) = 0. (3.18)
Substituting z = 2δx
σ2
and hi(x) = mi(z), we obtain h
′
i(x) =
(
2δ
σ2
)
m′i(z) and h
′′
i (x) =(
2δ
σ2
)2
m′′i (z). The equation (3.18) then becomes
zm′′i (z) + (b− z)m′i(z)− βimi(z) = 0 (3.19)
where
b =
2α
σ2
+ 2β.
Equation (3.19) is known as the Kummer equation and its solution is given by the
Kummer’s M functions, denoted as M in the following. The Kummer M function is
also known as confluent hypergeometric function. Details on the KummerM function
can be obtained from Abramowitz and Stegun (1972) [1]. It is clear that β2 is negative
and the Kummer M function takes the value 1 for the argument x = 0, we therefore
need to impose the condition A2 = 0 so as to get a finite value of the project at x = 0.
The solution of (3.14) is therefore
V0(x) = Ax
βM
(
β,
2α
σ2
+ 2β,
2δ
σ2
x
)
(3.20)
where A = A1 is a constant that is yet to be determined, β = β1 and M(a, b, z)
denotes Kummer’s M function.
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The free boundary conditions (3.4) and (3.5) become
Ax∗βs M
(
β,
2α
σ2
+ 2β,
2δ
σ2
x∗s
)
= V1(x
∗
s)− Is (3.21)
and
Ax∗βs
2βδ
2α+ 2βσ2
M
(
β + 1,
2α
σ2
+ 2β + 1,
2δ
σ2
x∗s
)
+βAx∗(β−1)s M
(
β,
2α
σ2
+ 2β,
2δ
σ2
x∗s
)
= (V1(x
∗
s))
′
.
(3.22)
Because V1(x) does not exist in analytic form, we have to replace its derivative by
the corresponding finite difference
(V1(x))
′ ≈ (V1(x+ h))− (V1(x))
h
.
To obtain V0(x) and x
∗
s we now proceed as follows: V1(x) has been obtained in the
previous step numerically and we know the value of V1(x) at each x ∈
{
x0 = 0, x1, x2, . . . , xn = x
∗
q
}
.
We first make a guess that x∗s = x1 and then use (3.21) to find out A. We then
substitute x1 and A in (3.22). If x1 and the corresponding A satisfy (3.22) up to a
certain level of tolerance; i.e. the difference between LHS and RHS of (3.22) is less
than a given small number ǫ (we use ǫ = 10−4 here), we take x∗s = x1. Otherwise we
move to x2 and carry on. The procedure is repeated until x
∗
s is found.
3.2.2. The Case of Geometric Brownian Motion
We are using the same procedure as in the previous subsection. We start with
solving the problem for V1(x) and x
∗
q, τ1 < t < τ2, using the dynamic constraint
(3.9) with the two free boundary conditions (3.6) and (3.7). With the chosen form of
F1(x(t)) and S(x(t)) we obtain the following Bellman equation
rV1 = µxV
′
1 +
1
2
σ2x2V ′′1 + (1− exp(−λx))− µx (3.23)
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with the same boundary conditions as in the case of geometric mean reversion, (3.11)
and (3.12). We solve this free boundary value problem numerically in a similar manner
as before. That is we first make a guess that the optimal threshold x∗q is xˆ and then
apply the shooting method to solve the boundary value problem (3.23) subject to
V1(0) = 0, since x(t) = 0 is also a fixed point of (3.9), and (3.11). We can check
whether xˆ is x∗q or not by using the smooth pasting condition (3.12).
Once V1(x) is obtained, we proceed to find V0(x) and x
∗
s under the dynamic con-
straint (3.8) and the two free boundary conditions (3.4) and (3.5). This problem leads
to the following Bellman equation
rV0 = αxV
′
0 +
1
2
σ2x2V ′′0 . (3.24)
As we can notice in the ordinary differential equation (3.24) that x occurs with the
same power as derivatives are taken, it follows that the elementary solution of the
value function is of the type
V0(x) = Ax
β.
By substitution in (3.24), we obtain
αβAxβ +
1
2
σ2β(β − 1)Axβ − rAxβ = 0
and hence we can identify β as the solution of the following quadratic equation
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − r = 0.
The two solutions are
β1 =
−(α− 1
2
σ2) +
√
(α− 1
2
σ2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
(3.25)
β2 =
−(α− 1
2
σ2)−
√
(α− 1
2
σ2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
. (3.26)
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This leads to a general form
V0(x) = A1x
β1 + A2x
β2 .
It is obvious that β2 is negative and for the same reason as before, i.e. to ensure the
finite value of the project at x = 0, we must have A2 = 0. The solution of (3.24) is
therefore
V0(x) = Ax
β (3.27)
where A = A1 is a constant that is yet to be determined and β = β1.
The two free boundary conditions (3.4) and (3.5) are translated to
Ax∗βs = V1(x
∗
s)− Is (3.28)
and
βAx∗(β−1)s = (V1(x
∗
s))
′ (3.29)
To solve for V0(x) and x
∗
s we proceed in the same way as before. Note that in (3.29)
V ′1(x) is once more replaced by the corresponding finite difference.
3.3. Numerical Results
In this section we discuss the results of our numerical computations which are based
on the previous two sections. We will give an example of the numerical results based
on a given set of parameters’ values. We also undertake a comparative analysis and
discuss in particular how the threshold levels x∗s and x
∗
q are affected by changes in the
parameters. In addition, we investigate the relationship between uncertainty and the
expected time the private company will develop the project under the concessionary
agreement.
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3.3.1. The Case of Geometric Mean Reversion
In the following we discuss the geometric mean reversion based model (3.1)-(3.3).
• A numerical example
For the purpose of illustration, the following parameters are chosen: λ = 0.4, r =
0.2, δ = 0.05, µ = 0.2, σ = 0.1, α = 0.2, Iq = 1 and Is = 0.7. The numerical results
obtained for V0(x), x
∗
s as well as V1(x), x
∗
q are displayed in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2
respectively.
Figure 3.1 displays the value functions, V0(x) and V1(x), as a function of the level
of development x. The dashed line in the figure represents the private company’s
value function before entering the concessionary agreement, i.e. V0(x), whereas the
thick line represents the company’s value function after investing in the project minus
the sunk costs the company needs to pay when the company adopts the project, i.e.
V1(x) − Is. Our computation shows that it is optimal for the company to invest in
the project at the threshold of x∗s = 1.2182.
Figure 3.2 displays the value function of the private company before ending the
concessionary agreement, i.e. V1(x) (thick line) as well as the terminal payoff after
reduction by the penalty fee, i.e. x − Iq (dashed line), as a function of the level
of development x. Our numerical results show that it is optimal for the private
company to end the concessionary agreement once the level of development reaches
the threshold, x∗q = 2.7104.
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• Comparative analysis and effects on the thresholds
There are several parameters in the model that could affect the private company’s
value function, V (x), and thus the thresholds, x∗s and x
∗
q. For each case, we investigate
the changes in the thresholds and value functions, V0(x) and V1(x) with three different
values for each parameter while the values of the remaining parameters are fixed. The
results are displayed in Figures 3.3-3.10. The parameters that we consider are:
(i) uncertainty measured in terms of the instantaneous volatility σ,
(ii) the private company contribution µ,
(iii) the depreciation parameter δ,
(iv) the penalty fee Iq.
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show how σ affects the value functions and the thresholds,
and Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 demonstrate the effects of µ on the results. Figure
3.7 and Figure 3.8 illustrate the change in the value functions and thresholds as a
consequence of changes in δ. The penalty fee the private company needs to pay if it
decides to end the concessionary agreement, i.e. Iq, also affects the results as shown
in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10.
It can be seen in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 that the thresholds, x∗s and x
∗
q, both
increase as σ increases. The larger σ is, the greater the uncertainty component in the
level of development. This uncertainty results in delays in the company both entering
and ending the concessionary agreement. The effects of µ on the thresholds can be
observed in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6. Our results show that µ positively impacts
on x∗s but negatively on x
∗
q. This is intuitive as µ represents the money the firm
contributes to development. An increase in µ therefore increases the development
72 Walailuck Chavanasporn
growth, but also increases the costs carried by the private company while it holds the
concession. The increase in costs will make it less attractive for the company to enter
the concessionary agreement.
The impact of depreciation, δ, on the thresholds is displayed in Figures 3.7 and 3.8.
The threshold to enter the concessionary agreement, x∗s, increases as δ increases, while
the threshold for ending, x∗q, decreases. Depreciation is essentially a cost that must
be carried by the private company under the concessionary agreement, and therefore
the intuition behind this result is essentially the same as in the previous paragraph.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 display the effect of the penalty fee Iq the firm needs to pay
if it would like to end the concessionary agreement. In Figure 3.9, we observe that
the amount of the penalty does not have any significant effect on the threshold for
entering but does affect the value function, V0(x). This is intuitive as the penalty
fee is also a kind of cost that the private company has to carry. In Figure 3.10 we
observe that the higher the penalty fee, the longer the firm will choose to remain in
the concessionary agreement. The reason for this is that the firm needs to wait for
higher terminal benefits S(x∗q) in order to compensate for the higher penalty fees.
We now consider the following two parameters which are expected to affect only the
value function, V0(x), and the threshold, x
∗
s, for entering the concessionary agreement.
These two parameters do not have any impact on the value function after entering the
agreement V1(x) and the threshold x
∗
q for ending the agreement. The two parameters
are:
(i) the government distribution α,
(ii) the sunk costs Is.
Chapter 3 73
Figure 3.11 demonstrates that the threshold, x∗s, increases as α increases. As α
increases, the value of the drift term in the level of development x also increases.
This increase produces an increase in the average value of x and hence the value of
V0(x) also increases. However, the increase in x
∗
s should not be interpreted as meaning
that the private company becomes more cautious in entering the agreement. Instead
it means that the private company expects the government to push up the level of
development more quickly to a higher level at which it will become more profitable
for the private company to enter.
It can be observed in Figure 3.12 that the critical value to adopt the project, x∗s,
has a positive relation to sunk costs, Is. This can be understood as follows. The
higher the sunk costs that the company needs to pay once it enters the concessionary
agreement, the less incentive it has to do so. The private company needs to wait
longer to guarantee that the value of the project is high enough to recover the sunk
costs once it adopts the project.
74 Walailuck Chavanasporn
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
← σ = 0.1
← σ = 0.15
← σ = 0.2
x
V 0
(x)
 an
d V
1(x
)
r = 0.2 ; λ = 0.4 ; δ = 0.05 ; µ = 0.2 ; α = 0.2 ; Iq = 1 ; Is = 0.7
V0
V1 − Is
Figure 3.3: GMR: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering the
concessionary agreement for a range of σ values
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
← σ = 0.1
← σ = 0.15
← σ = 0.2
x
V 1
(x)
  a
nd
  x
 − 
I q
r = 0.2 ; λ = 0.4 ; δ = 0.05 ; µ = 0.2 ; Iq = 1
V1
x − Iq
Figure 3.4: GMR: Value function; V1(x), and the terminal payoff, and the threshold x
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Figure 3.5: GMR: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering the
concessionary agreement for a range of µ values
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Figure 3.6: GMR: Value function; V1(x), and the terminal payoff, and the threshold x
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ending the concessionary agreement for a range of µ values
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Figure 3.7: GMR: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering the
concessionary agreement for a range of δ values
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Figure 3.8: GMR: Value function; V1(x), and the terminal payoff, and the threshold x
∗
q for
ending the concessionary agreement for a range of δ values
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Figure 3.9: GMR: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering the
concessionary agreement for a range of Iq values
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Figure 3.10: GMR: Value function; V1(x), and the terminal payoff, and the threshold x
∗
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for ending the concessionary agreement for a range of Iq values
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Figure 3.11: GMR: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering
the concessionary agreement for a range of α values
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Figure 3.12: GMR: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering
the concessionary agreement for a range of Is values
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• The effect of uncertainty on the expected length of the concessionary
agreement
In the previous section, we examined the effects of each parameter on the thresh-
olds, x∗s and x
∗
q. In this analysis we also included the uncertainty parameter σ. A
related, but conceptually different question is to ask for how long on average will the
concessionary agreement last. In this section we will determine the expected value of
the difference between τ2 and τ1 when optimal thresholds are applied under different
levels of uncertainty. The complexity of our model prevents us from obtaining analytic
results about exit times, such as in Sarkar (2000) [66]. Instead we apply Monte Carlo
simulation. As our problem is path-dependent, particular care has to be taken in
generating paths. Standard theory on numerical simulation of stochastic differential
equations suggests the Euler-Milstein schemes, which feature a strong convergence
rate of 1.
Using Euler-Milstein, the discrete approximations of x(t) following (3.2) for t < τ1
and (3.3) for t ≥ τ1 are
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + (α− δx(t))x(t)∆t+ σx(t)∆W + 1
2
σ2x(t)[(∆W )2 −∆t], x(0) = x0
(3.30)
and
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + (µ− δx(t))x(t)∆t+ σx(t)∆W + 1
2
σ2x(t)[(∆W )2 −∆t] (3.31)
respectively.
Given the two thresholds for entry and exit x∗s and x
∗
q, and an initial value of the
project x0 < x
∗
s, we repeat the simulation of the level of development of the project,
x(t), many times using (3.30) and (3.31) and take the average value of the times the
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concessionary agreement lasts, i.e. the time the paths have spent between x∗s and x
∗
q.
This average of the simulations is taken as an approximation for the expected value
E [τ2 − τ1].
For the purpose of illustration, the following parameter values have been chosen:
λ = 0.6, r = 0.2, µ = 0.3, δ = 0.1, α = 0.3, Iq = 1 and Is = 0.7. In our simulation,
we consider eleven different values of σ which are 0.1, 0.11, 0.12, . . . , 0.2. Figure 3.13
shows the expected values E [τ2 − τ1] for each value of σ. In the analysis in the previous
section we have observed that increasing the value of σ also gives an increase in the
values of x∗s and x
∗
q. Our results now show that E [τ2 − τ1] appears to be increasing
with σ. This means that concessionary agreements are likely to last longer as the
uncertainty increases.
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Figure 3.13: GMR: Expected value of τ2 − τ1 for a range of σ values
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3.3.2. The Case of Geometric Brownian Motion
We now consider the case (3.1), (3.8)-(3.9) where the level of development is
modelled as a geometric Brownian motion.
• A numerical example
In our numerical anlyisis we use the following parameter values: λ = 0.4, r =
0.2, µ = 0.17, σ = 0.1, α = 0.17, Iq = 1 and Is = 0.7. The results are shown in Figure
3.14 and Figure 3.15 respectively.
Figure 3.14 displays the value functions, V0(x) and V1(x), as a function of the level
of development x when x follows a geometric Brownian motion. In the figure the
dashed line illustrates the company’s value function before entering the agreement,
V0(x), whereas the thick line illustrates the company’s value function after entering the
agreement minus the sunk costs the company has to pay when entering, V1(x)−Is. Our
results shows that it is optimal for the company to enter the concessionary agreement
when the threshold x∗s = 0.8422 is reached.
Figure 3.15 displays the value function, V1(x), and terminal payoff, as a function of
the level of development x. In the figure the thick line represents the value function
of the company before ending the agreement, V1(x), while the dashed line represents
the terminal payoff, x − Iq. Our results show that it is optimal for the company to
end the agreement when the threshold x∗q = 5.5876 is reached.
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Figure 3.14: GBM: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering
the concessionary agreement
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Figure 3.15: GBM: Value function; V1(x), and the terminal payoff, and the threshold x
∗
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for ending the concessionary agreement
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• Comparative analysis and effects on the thresholds
In this section we vary the same parameters as in the geometric mean reversion
case (except that there is no depreciation here) and study how the company’s value
function V (x) and threshold levels x∗s and x
∗
q are affected.
Figures 3.16-3.21 show the dependence on the various parameters of the value
functions, V0(x), V1(x) and terminal payoff as well as thresholds, x
∗
s and x
∗
q.
Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17 show how σ affects the value functions and the thresh-
olds, whereas Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19 illustrate the changes in the value functions
and the thresholds caused by changes in µ. The effect of the penalty fee that the
private company needs to pay to the government if it decides to end the agreement,
Iq, can be seen in Figure 3.20 and Figure 3.21.
The effect of the government contribution, α, as well as the sunk costs the company
needs to pay once the company enters the agreement, Is, also affect the results but
only prior to entering, i.e. V0(x) and the threshold, x
∗
s. The effects of changes in α
and Is are displayed in Figure 3.22 and Figure 3.23.
On comparing the geometric Brownian motion case with the geometric mean re-
version case, we find that the parameters, σ, µ, Iq, α and Is, have the same qualitative
effects on the thresholds, x∗s and x
∗
q in both cases. The same intuition applies for both
cases.
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Figure 3.16: GBM: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering
the concessionary agreement for a range of σ values.
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Figure 3.17: GBM: Value function; V1(x), and the terminal payoff, and the threshold x
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for ending the concessionary agreement for a range of σ values.
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Figure 3.18: GBM: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering
the concessionary agreement for a range of µ values.
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Figure 3.19: GBM: Value function; V1(x), and the terminal payoff, and the threshold x
∗
q
for ending the concessionary agreement for a range of µ values.
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Figure 3.20: GBM: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering
the concessionary agreement for a range of Iq values.
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Figure 3.21: GBM: Value function; V1(x), and the terminal payoff, and the threshold x
∗
q
for ending the concessionary agreement for a range of Iq values.
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Figure 3.22: GBM: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering
the concessionary agreement for a range of α values,
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Figure 3.23: GBM: Value functions; V0(x) and V1(x), and the threshold x
∗
s for entering
the concessionary agreement for a range of Is values.
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• The effect of uncertainty on the expected length of the concessionary
agreement
As in the geometric mean reversion case, we are interested in the impact of uncertainty,
measured in terms of the instantaneous volatility σ, on the time τ2 − τ1 that the
concessionary agreement is in effect. As before, the idea is to find the expected value
of τ2 − τ1 using Monte Carlo simulation and the Euler-Milstein method. In this case
x(t) follows (3.8) for t < τ1 and (3.9) for t ≥ τ1. The Euler-Milstein scheme is given
as
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + αx(t)∆t+ σx(t)∆W +
1
2
σ2x(t)[(∆W )2 −∆t], x(0) = x0 (3.32)
and
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + µx(t)∆t+ σx(t)∆W +
1
2
σ2x(t)[(∆W )2 −∆t] (3.33)
respectively.
Given the two thresholds for entry and exit, x∗s and x
∗
q, and an initial value for
the level of development, x0 < x
∗
s, we use Monte Carlo simulation as in the geometric
mean reversion case in order to compute E [τ2 − τ1]. In our numerical example we have
chosen the following set of parameters: λ = 0.4, r = 0.2, µ = 0.18, α = 0.18, Iq = 1
and Is = 0.7. We use eleven different values for σ which are 0.1, 0.11, 0.12, . . . , 0.2.
Figure 3.24 displays σ and the expected value of τ2 − τ1. The result shows the same
relationship between σ and E [τ2 − τ1] as in the geometric mean reversion case, i.e.
the higher the uncertainty, the longer the concessionary agreement is expected to last.
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Figure 3.24: GBM: Expected value of τ2 − τ1 with different σ
3.4. Conclusions
In this chapter, we have studied the problem where a private company is given a
concession by a state government to develop a project. The optimal time to enter
the concessionary agreement and the optimal time to end it, have been computed
using different modelling assumptions, i.e. geometric mean reversion and geometric
Brownian motion. The effect of various model parameters on the threshold levels
for entry and exit has been analysed. Given a set of parameter values, we find
that in both cases, GMR and GBM, the parameters that we consider which are
σ, µ, Iq, α and Is, have the same qualitative effects on the both thresholds for enter
and exit the concessionary agreement. Moreover, the effects of uncertainty on the
expected time the concessionary agreement is expected to last has been investigated
by means of Monte Carlo simulation. The simulations show that the expected time
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the concessionary agreement is expected to be active is increasing in the value of
uncertainty.
Chapter 4
A Numerical Method for Solving
Stochastic Optimal Control
Problems with Linear Control
Stochastic optimal control problems frequently occur in Economics and Finance. In
this chapter we study problems which are linear in the control and illustrate a simple
but effective method to solve such problems. To make the illustration of the method
as clear as possible, we provide the explicit example of the situation in which a firm is
considering investing in a project with uncertain completion time, such as building a
factory or an office tower. The level of completion represents the state variable. Once
the project is fully completed, an asset, a factory or an office tower for example, will
be obtained with certainty and will lead to a financial benefit for the firm. Problems
of this kind have been studied in Pindyck (1993) [61], however the focus there is on
the underlying economic theory, while our focus is on numerical computation.
Only a small class of stochastic optimal control problems admits analytic solutions
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for the value function and the corresponding optimal strategies. Two classical ap-
proaches in solving stochastic optimal control problems numerically are either to use
finite differences to solve the corresponding Bellman equation, or, finite state Markov
chain approximation to reduce the problem to a finite dimensional one, which can
then be solved by using vector-matrix operations. For more details, see Kushner and
Dupuis (2001) [44]. Both approaches however have their limitations and do not work
well in the case where the problem is linear in the control. In this case the optimal
strategy switches between two modes, a maximum and a minimum control mode, and
the Bellman equation effectively breaks down into two differential equations, which
are linked at the threshold where it is optimal to switch. In our specific example,
the optimal investment rate takes as a value either a fixed rate of investment or zero
investment. Then the Bellman equation will consist of two differential equations, one
differential equation for the case where the firm does not invest and another differential
equation for the case where the firm invests.
Approximation of the solution by polynomial interpolation appears to be a good
choice of method to deal with the numerical problem of solving the problem discussed
above. Similar to finite state Markov chain approximation, this method reduces the
problem to a finite dimensional problem, which can be dealt with effectively in terms
of matrix-vector operations. In order to carry out the polynomial interpolation,
we discretise the state space into subintervals and in each small interval we use a
polynomial approximation to the solution.
A collocation method with spline functions has been used in solving some classes
of differential equations in both initial-value problems (IVP) and boundary-value
problems (BVP). For IVP, Loscalzo and Talbot (1967) [46] used spline functions to
approximate the solutions of the Cauchy problem for y′ = f(x, y). Micula (1973) [55]
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made use of spline functions in approximating the solution of the Cauchy problem
regarding a second order differential equation; that is y′′ = f(x, y); y(0) = y0, y
′(0) =
y′0. The literature concerning the application of collocation methods with spline
functions in solving BVP originates from the pioneer work of Ahlberg and Ito (1975)
[2]. In this paper, collocation methods are applied in using odd-degree splines, started
with cubic splines and later extending to the use of quintic and septic splines, for the
numerical solution of second order two-point BVP. Sakai and Usmani (1983) [65]
approximated the solutions of two-point boundary value problems for second order
equations by spline functions. In addition, Khalifa and Eilbeck (1981) [40] considered
both odd and even degree splines for the second order two-point BVP. A surprising
result obtained is that it is not always true that cubic splines will lead to better result
than quadratic splines.
In general, we solve for the optimal threshold, that is, the level x∗ of the state
variable at which it is optimal to switch, from the value matching and smooth
pasting conditions applied to the two differential equations discussed above. More
specifically, these two conditions demand that the values and the first derivatives of
the value function below and above the threshold x∗ take the same values at x∗. The
condition involving the first derivative allows us to make use of quadratic splines in
approximating the value function. However, in some cases we can additionally impose
a condition to guarantee that the second order derivatives below and above x∗ are
equal at x∗. This condition allows us to use cubic polynomials to interpolate the
solution of the differential equations.
In this chapter, we apply the idea of using quadratic splines to approximate the
solution of two-point BVP to solve stochastic optimal control problems when the
model is linear in control. We also provide conditions which will enable us to use
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cubic splines in the approximation. Furthermore, we demonstrate how to reduce the
dimension of the resulting algorithm leading to a faster and less memory-consuming
method.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 contains the main
idea of using quadratic splines to solve general two-point boundary-value problems.
The idea for how to apply this method to stochastic optimal control problems when
the model is linear in the control is provided in Section 4.2. This section also includes
an explicit example. In Section 4.3, we discuss how to improve the method by reducing
the dimension of the corresponding system of linear equations, leading to a reduction
in time and memory consumption. Section 4.4 presents the idea of applying cubic
splines to solve stochastic optimal control problems with linear control. Finally, our
conclusions are summarised in Section 4.5.
4.1. Solving Two-Point Boundary-Value Problems by Quadratic Splines
In this section we briefly summarise the idea of how to use quadratic polynomial
interpolation in order to obtain an approximation to the solution of a general two-
point BVP.
Consider the second order BVP in the following form
y′′(x) = f(x, y(x), y′(x)) ; y(a) = y0 , y(b) = yn, x ∈ [a, b]. (4.1)
Let a = x0 < x1 < . . . < xn = b be a uniform partition of the interval [a, b] with
h = b−a
n
, so that xi = a+ ih for i = 0, 1, . . . , n.
Let Pi(x) = aix
2 + bix + ci be the quadratic polynomial approximation of y(x) in
each subinterval [xi−1, xi] for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Using quadratic polynomials Pi(x) to interpolate the solution y(x) in each
subinterval [xi−1, xi]
Our objective is to identify each of the unknown coefficients ai, bi and ci for i =
1, 2, . . . , n. In total, there are 3n unknown coefficients, which means that we need
3n equations to uniquely identify all unknowns. These equations can be found in the
following way. First, from the property of continuity and differentiability, at each
common point, not only the value but the first derivative from the left and right have
to be equal, i.e., for i = 1, . . . , n, we have that
Pi(xi) = Pi+1(xi)
and P ′i (xi) = P
′
i+1(xi).
These conditions result in 2(n − 1) equations. Next, for each i = 1, . . . , n, we
have that Pi(x) must satisfy the differential equation (4.1). That is, in each small
interval [xi−1, xi] we have that P
′′
i (x¯i) = f (x¯i, Pi(x¯i), P
′
i (x¯i)) where x¯i ∈ [xi−1, xi]. We
normally use x¯i as the midpoint of the interval, i.e. x¯i =
xi−1+xi
2
. This provides us
with n additional equations. Finally, the last two equations can be obtained from the
two boundary conditions. In total, we then have 2(n− 1) + n+ 2 = 3n equations for
determining all unknown coefficients.
Let us consider the differential equation (4.1). The linear equations system for
solving the unknown coefficients can be represented in terms of matrices by
AX = B, (4.2)
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where A is a 3n × 3n coefficient matrix, with each row constructed in the following
manner:
(i) The first row comes from the first boundary condition, P1(x0) = y0, which gives
the equation
a1x
2
0 + b1x0 + c1 = y0.
(ii) Rows 2 to n come from the equalities Pi(xi) = Pi+1(xi), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , (n− 1)},
so
aix
2
i + bixi + ci = ai+1x
2
i + bi+1xi + ci+1
⇔ aix2i + bixi + ci − ai+1x2i − bi+1xi − ci+1 = 0.
(iii) Rows (n + 1) to (2n − 1) come from the fact that the slopes at each common
point are equal, that is, P ′i (xi) = P
′
i+1(xi), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , (n− 1)}. We
obtain the equations
2aixi + bi = 2ai+1xi + bi+1
⇔ 2aixi + bi − 2ai+1xi − bi+1 = 0.
(iv) Rows 2n to (3n − 1) are determined by the fact that each of the Pi(x) must
satisfy the diffential equation (4.1), so for i ∈ {1, . . . , (n− 1)} we obtain
f(x¯i, Pi(x¯i), P
′
i (x¯i))− 2ai = 0.
(v) The last row comes from the other boundary condition, Pn(xn) = yn, which
yelds the equation
anx
2
n + bnxn + cn = yn.
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The vectorX contains the 3n unknown coefficients, i.e. [a1 b1 c1 . . . an bn cn]
T ,
while the vector B is given by the right-hand side of the linear equations system, i.e.
[y0 0 . . . 0 yn]
T .
The vector X can then formally be computed in the following way
X = A−1B.
After X is computed, all Pi(x) = aix
2 + bix+ ci; i = 1, . . . , n; x ∈ [xi−1, xi] which is
the approximation of the solution y are found.
4.2. Applying Quadratic Splines for Solving Stochastic Optimal Control
Problems
In this section, we adapt the method presented in the previous section to solve
stochastic optimal control problems which are linear in control. To make this sec-
tion more accessible, we illustrate our approach using the example indicated in the
introduction. This will be presented in two subsections. In the first subsection
we compute an analytic expression for the value function. We apply the proposed
numerical approach in the second subsection in order to obtain an approximation. As
we discussed in the introduction, availability of an analytic expression represents the
exceptional case, however here it allows us to benchmark and test our method.
Our specific example is a simplified version of the investment problem under uncer-
tain cost discussed in Pindyck (1993) [61]. The situation we consider is that a firm is
facing a decision problem of investing into a project. The project takes an uncertain
time to complete. Let x ∈ [0, 1] be the level of completion, where x = 0 means that
no work on the project has been undertaken, whereas x = 1 means the project is fully
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completed. Upon completion, the firm receives an asset whose value, M , is known
with certainty.
The resulting optimisation problem is given as:
V (x) = max
u∈[0,k]
{
E
[
e−rτM −
∫ τ
0
e−rtu(t)x(t)dt
]}
(4.3)
subject to
dx(t) = (µ+ u(t))x(t)dt+ σx(t)dW (t) ; x(0) = x0 ; x ∈ [0, 1] . (4.4)
The firm maximises (4.3) subject to (4.4). It has a fixed contribution rate µ and a
choice of investment u(t) which the firm can decide upon how much it should invest
into the project with the maximum investment rate k > 0. The fixed contribution
can be thought of as a rental or storage cost that the firm needs to pay no matter
what it invests into the project. The parameter σ > 0 denotes the volatility and
W (t) stands for a standard Wiener process. In the objective function, equation (4.3),
M represents the benefit the firm obtains from the asset that results from the fully
completed project, whereas u(t)x(t) represents the investment cost. A linear cost
function here is chosen for convenience, but makes sense in many cases. For example,
if the project consists of building an office tower, the higher the construction, the
higher the level of completion, the higher the costs. Similarly, if the project is the
construction of a road to access a rural area, the further the road is built, the higher
the costs. The stopping time τ denotes the time of completion and can be written as
τ := inf {t|x(t) ≥ 1} . (4.5)
The stopping time is uncertain, due to the inclusion of the Wiener process into our
model, but also depends on the firm’s investment decisions.
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The corresponding Bellman equation is given by
rV (x) = max
u∈[0,k]
{
(µ+ u)xV ′(x) +
1
2
σ2x2V ′′(x)− ux
}
. (4.6)
Due to equation (4.6) being linear in u, the rate of investment that maximises the
right hand side of (4.6) is always either zero or the maximum rate k:
u∗ =


k ; V ′(x)− 1 ≥ 0
0 ; otherwise.
(4.7)
Let V0(x) and Vk(x) denote the value functions when the firm invest 0 and k,
respectively. The optimal threshold x∗ can be found by solving (4.6) subject to the
following conditions:
V0(x
∗) = Vk(x
∗) (4.8)
V ′0(x
∗) = V ′k(x
∗) (4.9)
V ′(x∗)− 1 = 0 (4.10)
as well as the boundary conditions V0(0) = 0 and Vk(1) =M .
Equation (4.8) is referred to as the value matching condition and equation (4.9) is
called the smooth pasting condition. Equation (4.10) is the condition that guarantees
that the control is optimal at the threshold. We can conclude that the optimal
investment strategy consists of the firm investing k if x ≥ x∗, and investing 0 if x < x∗,
continuously over time, which means that the firm will switch between investing with
a fixed rate k and not investing at all.
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4.2.1. Analytic Solution
This subsection contains analytic solutions of the optimisation problem (4.3)-(4.4)
and a discussion of these solutions. In order to solve the free boundary-value problem
described above, we start by substituting u∗ into (4.6). The Bellman equations for
V0(x) and Vk(x) become
rV0(x) = µxV
′
0(x) +
1
2
σ2x2V ′′0 (x), (4.11)
which holds for x < x∗, and
rVk(x) = (µ+ k)xV
′
k(x) +
1
2
σ2x2V ′′k (x)− kx, (4.12)
which holds for x > x∗.
We know that the solution of (4.11) is of the form V0(x) = Ax
β. Substitution into
(4.11) gives that
µβAxβ +
1
2
σ2β(β − 1)Axβ − rAxβ = 0
which leads to
1
2
σ2β2 + (µ− 1
2
σ2)β − r = 0
and
β =
−(µ− 1
2
σ2)±
√
(µ− 1
2
σ2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
.
We choose the positive β in order to guarantee that the value function has a finite
value at x = 0. This leads to the following solution
V0(x) = A0x
β0 , (4.13)
where A0 is still to be determined and
β0 =
−(µ− 1
2
σ2) +
√
(µ− 1
2
σ2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
. (4.14)
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For the differential equation (4.12), we claim that the solution is of the form Vk(x) =
Axβ + Cx. Substitution of the latter into (4.12), gives
(µ+ k)x
[
βAxβ−1 + C
]
+
1
2
σ2β(β − 1)Axβ − kx− r [Axβ + Cx] = 0
⇔
[
1
2
σ2β2 + (µ+ k − 1
2
σ2)β − r
]
Axβ + [(µ+ k − r)C − k] x = 0.
This leads to
1
2
σ2β2 + (µ+ k − 1
2
σ2)β − r = 0
and
(µ+ k − r)C − k = 0.
Therefore, the solution of Vk(x) is of the form
Vk(x) = A1x
β1 + A2x
β2 + Cx (4.15)
where A1, A2 are still to be determined and β1, β2, C are given by
β1 =
−(µ+ k − 1
2
σ2) +
√
(µ+ k − 1
2
σ2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
(4.16)
β2 =
−(µ+ k − 1
2
σ2)−
√
(µ+ k − 1
2
σ2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
(4.17)
C =
k
µ+ k − r . (4.18)
At the threshold x∗, the value matching and smooth pasting conditions must be
satisfied. From (4.13) and (4.15), we obtain the following equations
A0(x
∗)β0 = A1(x
∗)β1 + A2(x
∗)β2 + C(x∗)
β0A0(x
∗)β0−1 = β1A1(x
∗)β1−1 + β2A2(x
∗)β2−1 + C.
From the boundary condition Vk(1) =M , we obtain that
A1 + A2 + C =M. (4.19)
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Rearranging this, we have that A2 =M−A1−C. Substitution into the value matching
and smooth pasting conditions provides
A0(x
∗)β0 + A1
[
(x∗)β2 − (x∗)β1] = (M − C)xβ2 + Cx (4.20)
β0A0(x
∗)β0−1 + A1
[
β2(x
∗)β2−1 − β1(x∗)β1−1
]
= (M − C) β2(x∗)β2−1 + C.(4.21)
For a given x∗, A0 and A1 can be computed by
 A0
A1

 =

 (x∗)β0 (x∗)β2 − (x∗)β1
β0(x
∗)β0−1 β2(x
∗)β2−1 − β1(x∗)β1−1


−1 (M − C) xβ2 + Cx
(M − C) β2(x∗)β2−1 + C

 .
(4.22)
Before continuing, we impose another condition, namely that the second derivative at
the threshold x∗ for both V0(x) and Vk(x) are equal, i.e. V
′′
0 (x
∗) = V ′′k (x
∗). Theorem
4.2 below provides the theoretical justification for this added condition. We can then
derive the following equation:
β0(β0 − 1)A0(x∗)β0−2 = β1(β1 − 1)A1(x∗)β1−2 + β2(β2 − 1)A2(x∗)β2−2. (4.23)
The approach of solving this system is as follows. It is clear that (4.22) can be solved
analytically if x∗ would be known. Therefore, we first make a guess at this value, say
x∗ = x˜. Then using x˜ we compute A0 and A1 by using equation (4.22). In addition,
A2 can be computed by A2 = M − A1 − C. Once A0, A1 and A2 are determined,
we use (4.23) to check whether x˜ is sufficiently close to x∗ or not. If not, we move
to x∗ = x˜ + ǫ, where ǫ is a given small positive number. The procedure is repeated
until x∗ is found with sufficient accuracy. Note that in here we solve the model by
using three conditions, namely the value matching, smooth pasting and second order
conditions, given in (4.8), (4.9) and (4.23), respectively. By Theorem 4.2 the condition
which guarantees that the control is optimal, (4.10), is implied. 1
1Note that even in very simple models, the threshold level is in general computed numerically,
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In the following, we give an example of the numerical results which can be obtained
with a given set of parameter values. For the purpose of illustration, the following
parameters have been chosen: r = 0.04, µ = 0.02, σ = 0.2, k = 0.1 and M = 1.
Figure 4.2 shows the value functions V0(x) and Vk(x) as a function of the level of
completion x. In the figure, the dashed line represents the value function V0(x) of the
firm when it invests 0, whereas the solid line represents the value function Vk(x) of
the firm when it invests k. According to the simulation, it is optimal for the firm to
invest with the investment rate k when x is greater than or equal to the threshold
x∗ = 0.28376 and to momentarily stop investing if x is less than the threshold x∗.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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V(
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V0(x)
Vk(x)
Figure 4.2: Analytic Solution: The value functions of the firm when it invests 0, V0(x),
and k, Vk(x), in the project
while the value function is obtained in analytical form. This is why we consider the approach
presented here still as analytical, even though a number of parameters is obtained numerically
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4.2.2. Numerical Solution
In this subsection we demonstrate our numerical method for solving the investment
problem described above. Recall that we are aiming to solve equations (4.11) and
(4.12) subject to (4.8), (4.9) and (4.10). The idea to use quadratic splines to solve
this free BVP is followed up.
Figure 4.3: Numerical idea for solving the problem
We first discretise the state space, x, into n equal small intervals. For j = 1, . . . , (n−
1), we suppose x∗ = xj which is one of the grid points of x. Then using quadratic
polynomials Pi(x) = aix
2+bix+ci to interpolate V (x) ; x ∈ [xi−1, xi] ; i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
we create the linear equations system AX = B as described in Section 4.1. The
method of constructing the 3n×3n coefficient matrix A is similar to the normal BVP.
That is the first and the last rows are derived from the two boundary conditions.
Rows 2 to n are derived from the property that the values from the left and the right
at each common point are equal. Also, rows (n + 1) to (2n − 1) come from the fact
that the slopes on the left and the right at each common point have to be equal.
The only difference comes in rows (2n) to (3n − 1), which are constructed from the
differential equations.
We know that V (x) consists of two parts, V0(x) which follows (4.11) and Vk(x)
which follows (4.12). Therefore, we divide rows (2n) to (3n − 1) of the coefficient
matrix A into two parts depending upon where the point xj lies. The value xj is now
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taking the role of x∗. For the first part, rows (2n) to (2n+ j − 1), for all xi ≤ xj, we
use equation (4.11) to construct the relations, while the second part, rows (2n+ j) to
(3n− 1), for all xi > xj, we instead use equation (4.12).
The 3n× 1 vector X represents the unknown coefficients of the system, i.e.
[a1 b1 c1 . . . an bn cn]
T .
The 3n×1 vector B stands for the right-hand side of the system of linear equations
which is [0 . . . 0 M ]T in this model. The vector X can be easily computed by
X = A−1B. Once X is obtained, we can find the optimal threshold x∗ by x∗ = xj
such that min
j
{err(xj)} where
err(xj) = |(2aj+1xj + bj+1 − 1)| .2 (4.24)
This equation comes from (4.10) and Pi(x) = aix
2 + bix + ci. Hence, if xj is
sufficiently close to x∗, the error (defined in (4.24)) at xj will be at its minimum.
Using the same parameter values as in the previous subsection, we obtain results
for different levels of discretisation, n, shown in Table 4.1. (Recall that the exact
value for x∗ from the previous section is 0.28376.) Moreover, Figure 4.4 shows the
numerical solution for the value function V (x) when n = 500.
The following theorem indicates the accuracy of using quadratic polynomials to
interpolate the solution of the second order differential equation.
Theorem 4.1. Let f ∈ C3 [a, b] satisfying a(t)f ′′(t) + b(t)f ′(t) + c(t)f(t) + d(t) = 0.
If p2 is the quadratic spline interpolant to f with respect to the nodes a = x0 < x1 <
2One can alternatively use {aj , bj} instead of {aj+1, bj+1} because at any common point
xi, 2aixi + bi = 2ai+1xi + bi+1. Also one could use a second order condition instead of (4.10)
since in the light of Theorem 4.2, they are equivalent.
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Table 4.1: Numerical Results: Quadratic Polynomial Interpolation
n x∗ min
j
{err(xj)}
100 0.2800 0.005504
200 0.2850 0.001809
400 0.2850 0.001800
500 0.2840 3.449923× 10−4
. . . < xn = b,
|f(x)− p2(x)| ≤ O (h) ,
where h = b−a
n
.
Proof. The error of polynomial interpolation pn ∈
∏
n, where n is the degree of the
polynomial, of a given function f over the interval [a, b] is
E(t) = f(t)− pn(t) = f
(n+1)(c)
(n+ 1)!
(
n∏
0
(t− xi)
)
for some c ∈ [a, b] . (4.25)
Let q(t) = p′2(t) and g(t) = f
′(t). For any two given boundary points xi−1 and
xi, we use the linear polynomial interpolation q(t) to interpolate g(t) in the interval
[xi−1, xi].
f ′(t)− p′2(t) = q(t)− g(t) =
g(2)(ci)
2!
(t− xi−1) (t− xi) for some ci ∈ [xi−1, xi] .
(4.26)
The maximum of (t− xi−1)(t− xi) over the interval [xi−1, xi] occurs at the midpoint.
This makes the maximum
(
h
2
)2
where h is the length of the interval. This leads to
the inquality
|f ′(t)− p′2(t)| ≤
f (3)(ci)
2
(
h
2
)2
=
f (3)(ci)
8
h2 = O (h2) . (4.27)
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Figure 4.4: Numerical solution from quadratic polynomial interpolation: The value
function V (x) when n = 500
To calculate the error in the second derivative terms, we differentiate (4.26) once, to
obtain:
f ′′(t)− p′′2(t) =
f (3)(ci)
2!
[(t− xi−1) + (t− xi)] .
From this, we have the inequality
|f ′′(t)− p′′2(t)| ≤ f (3)(ci)h = O (h) . (4.28)
From (4.26), we can identify the error of f(t) by
∣∣∣∣
∫ xi
xi−1
(f ′(t)− p′2(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫ xi
xi−1
|f ′(t)− p′2(t)| dt
≤
∫ xi
xi−1
f (3)(ci)
8
h2dt
=
f (3)(ci)
8
h2
∫ xi
xi−1
dt
=
f (3)(ci)
8
h3.
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Let α = maxi
∣∣f (3)(ci)∣∣. Then, the following calculation finishes the proof.
E(t) = a(t) |f ′′(t)− p′′2(t)|+ b(t) |f ′(t)− p′2(t)|+ c(t) |f(t)− p2(t)|
≤ a(t)f (3)(ci)h+ b(t)f
(3)(ci)
8
h2 + c(t)
f (3)(ci)
8
h3
≤ a(t)αih+ b(t)αi
8
h2 + c(t)
αi
8
h3 = O (h) 
We can see from the above theorem that the error of quadratic polynomial interpo-
lation is of order O(h). One possible way to obtain a better results is by using a higher
order of polynomial such as cubic polynomial in the interpolation. However, in order
to make use of cubic polynomials, we must have that the second order derivatives at
the threshold are equal. The following theorem gives the cases in which this condition
is satisfied.
Theorem 4.2. Consider the stochastic optimal control problem
max
u∈[0,k]
{
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt (f1 (x(t)) + f2 (x(t))u(t)) dt+ e
−rτS(x(τ))
]}
(4.29)
with
dx(t) = (µ1 (x(t)) + µ2 (x(t))u(t)) dt+σ (x(t)) dW (t)+γ (x(t))
√
u(t)dB(t); x ∈ [xL, xH ]
(4.30)
where W (t) and B(t) are independent Wiener Processes and
S(x) =


IH ; x = xH
IL ; x = xL.
(4.31)
Let V0(x) and Vk(x) be the value functions when the optimal control u
∗ is 0 and k
respectively, Define the five properties (in two groups; (G1) and (G2)) at the optimal
threshold x∗ as follows:
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(G1.1) : V0(x
∗) = Vk(x
∗)
(G1.2) : f2(x
∗) + µ2(x
∗)V ′(x∗) + γ
2(x∗)
2
V ′′(x∗) = 0
(G2.1) : V0(x
∗) = Vk(x
∗)
(G2.2) : V ′0(x
∗) = V ′k(x
∗)
(G2.3) : V ′′0 (x
∗) = V ′′k (x
∗).
If µ1(x
∗) 6= 0 and µ1(x∗)γ2(x∗)2 6= µ2(x∗)σ
2(x∗)
2
, (G1) is equivalent to (G2), i.e.,
(G1.1) and (G1.2) is equivalent to (G2.1),(G2.2) and (G2.3). 3
Proof. The Bellman equation associated to this problem is given by
rV (x) = max
u∈[0,k]
{
f1(x) + f2(x)u+ (µ1(x) + µ2(x)u)V
′(x) +
(
σ2(x) + γ2(x)u
2
)
V ′′(x)
}
and
u∗ =


0 ; f2(x) + µ2(x)V
′(x) + γ
2(x)
2
V ′′(x) < 0
k ; f2(x) + µ2(x)V
′(x) + γ
2(x)
2
V ′′(x) ≥ 0.
Hence the Bellman equations for V0(x) and Vk(x) are given by
rV0(x) = f1(x) + µ1(x)V
′
0(x) +
σ2(x)
2
V ′′0 (x)
rVk(x) = f1(x) + f2(x)k + (µ1(x) + µ2(x)k)V
′
k(x) +
σ2(x) + γ2(x)k
2
V ′′k (x)
(=>) Given (G1.1) and (G1.2), we aim to establish that (G2.1), (G2.2) and (G2.3)
must also hold.
3Note that (G1.1) is the value matching condition, while (G1.2) is the condition that guarantee
that the control is optimal at x∗. (G2.1) is the same as (G1.1), (G2.2) is the smooth pasting condition
and (G2.3) is the second order condition.
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Since V0(x
∗) = Vk(x
∗), we have that rV0(x
∗) = rVk(x
∗). This leads to
f1(x
∗) + µ1(x
∗)V ′0(x
∗) +
σ2(x∗)
2
V ′′0 (x
∗)
= f1(x
∗) + f2(x
∗)k + (µ1(x
∗) + µ2(x
∗)k)V ′k(x
∗) +
σ2(x∗) + γ2(x∗)k
2
V ′′k (x
∗)
= f1(x
∗) + µ1(x
∗)V ′k(x
∗) +
σ2(x∗)
2
V ′′k (x
∗) + k
(
f2(x
∗) + µ2(x
∗)V ′k(x
∗) +
γ2(x∗)
2
V ′′k (x
∗)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
.
case 1: σ = 0
µ1(x
∗)V ′0(x
∗) = µ1(x
∗)V ′k(x
∗)
since µ1(x
∗) 6= 0; V ′0(x∗) = V ′k(x∗). ((G2.2) holds)
Since V0(x) and Vk(x) are both V (x), they have to satisfy (G1.2). So
f2(x
∗) + µ2(x
∗)V ′0(x
∗) +
γ2(x∗)
2
V ′′0 (x
∗) = f2(x
∗) + µ2(x
∗)V ′k(x
∗) +
γ2(x∗)
2
V ′′k (x
∗) = 0
(4.32)
and V ′0(x
∗) = V ′k(x
∗). This implies that V ′′0 (x
∗) = V ′′k (x
∗). Hence (G2.3) holds.
case 2: σ 6= 0
µ1(x
∗)V ′0(x
∗) +
σ2(x∗)
2
V ′′0 (x
∗) = µ1(x
∗)V ′k(x
∗) +
σ2(x∗)
2
V ′′k (x
∗)
µ1(x
∗) [V ′k(x
∗)− V ′0(x∗)] +
σ2(x∗)
2
[V ′′k (x
∗)− V ′′0 (x∗)] = 0 (4.33)
Suppose that V ′0(x
∗) 6= V ′k(x∗). Then, due to (G1.2), we have that V ′′0 (x∗) 6= V ′′k (x∗).
Equation (4.32) leads to
µ2(x
∗) [V ′k(x
∗)− V ′0(x∗)] +
γ2(x∗)
2
[V ′′k (x
∗)− V ′′0 (x∗)] = 0 (4.34)
From (4.33) and (4.34), we have the following linear equations system:
 µ1(x∗) σ
2(x∗)
2
µ2(x
∗) γ
2(x∗)
2



 V ′k(x∗)− V ′0(x∗)
V ′′k (x
∗)− V ′′0 (x∗)

 =

 0
0

 .
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Since the first matrix is nonsingular, [V ′k(x
∗)− V ′0(x∗) V ′′k (x∗)− V ′′0 (x∗)]T has to
be 0 which contradicts to assumption made above. Therefore V ′0(x
∗) = V ′k(x
∗), and
again by (G1.2), we have that V ′′0 (x
∗) = V ′′k (x
∗).
(<=) Given (G2.1), (G2.2) and (G2.3), we are going to prove (G1.1) and (G1.2).
V0(x
∗) = Vk(x
∗)
f1(x
∗) + µ1(x
∗)V ′0(x
∗) +
σ2(x∗)
2
V ′′0 (x
∗) = f1(x
∗) + µ1(x
∗)V ′k(x
∗) +
σ2(x∗)
2
V ′′k (x
∗)
+k
(
f2(x
∗) + µ2(x
∗)V ′k(x
∗) +
γ2(x∗)
2
V ′′k (x
∗)
)
(G2.2) and (G2.3) yield
f2(x
∗) + µ2(x
∗)V ′k(x
∗) +
γ2(x∗)
2
V ′′k (x
∗) = 0
which concludes the proof. 
This theorem indicates which conditions are needed in order to impose the equality
of the second order derivatives at the threshold (G2.3). As mentioned earlier, the
advantage of having a second order condition is that if the second order condition at
the threshold (G2.3) holds in any specific examples, we can then use cubic polynomials
to interpolate the solutions instead of quadratic ones. Thus we can expect higher accu-
racy. Before we proceed to the idea of applying cubic polynomial in approximation of
the solutions of the stochastic optimal control problems, we discuss the way to improve
our method by reducing the size of the corresponding linear equations system.
4.3. A Dimension Reduction
A potential problem in applying the method described in the previous section is
that one faces a very large system of linear equations (LES) AX = B in case the
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discretising grid is chosen to be very fine, and that this system has to be solved each
time we want to test whether the chosen xj is sufficiently close to x
∗ or not. Recall
that the size of coefficient matrix is 3n× 3n where n is the number of discretisation.
In this section we show how to reduce the size of the LES from 3n unknowns to n+2
unknowns. This has the effect that the size of the coefficient matrix is reduced to
(n+ 2)× (n+ 2). The number of elements in the coefficient matrix is hence reduced
by a factor (3n)
2
(n+2)2
which is approximately equal to 9 for sufficiently large n. This will
help to reduce computing time significantly.
Let Pi(x) = aix
2+bix+ci denote the quadratic polynomials used in the interpolation
of y(x); x ∈ [xi−1, xi] with i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
To emphasise the intuition, we consider the case when n = 3. The general case is
obtained in a completely analogous way, however the book keeping is more difficult
and the size of the matrices makes it impossible to display them satisfactorily in the
text.
Figure 4.5: Polynomial interpolation: the case when n = 3
At both of the common points x1 and x2, the values and slopes from the left and
the right have to be equal. Hence we get:
at x1: P1(x1) = P2(x1) ⇒ a1x21 + b1x1 + c1 = a2x21 + b2x1 + c2
and P ′1(x1) = P
′
2(x1) ⇒ 2a1x1 + b1 = 2a2x1 + b2.
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These two relations lead to
b2 = 2a1x1 + b1 − 2a2x1 (4.35)
and c2 = −a1x21 + c1 + a2x21. (4.36)
At x2: P2(x2) = P3(x2) ⇒ a2x22 + b2x2 + c2 = a3x22 + b3x2 + c3
and P ′2(x2) = P
′
3(x2) ⇒ 2a2x2 + b2 = 2a3x2 + b3.
These two properties yield
b3 = 2a2x2 + b2 − 2a3x2 (4.37)
and c3 = −a2x22 + c2 + a3x22. (4.38)
The coefficients b3 and c3 can then be expressed as functions of a1, b1, c1, a2 and a3,
that is
b3 = 2a2x2 + b2 − 2a3x2
= 2a2x2 + (2a1x1 + b1 − 2a2x1)− 2a3x2
= 2a1x1 + b1 + (−2x1 + 2x2) a2 − 2a3x2 (4.39)
and c3 = −a2x22 + c2 + a3x22
= −a2x22 +
(−a1x21 + c1 + a2x21)+ a3x22
= −a1x21 + c1 +
(
x21 − x22
)
a2 + a3x
2
2. (4.40)
Using this substitution, the number of unknown coefficients in our LES is then re-
duced to 5 = 3+2 = n+2; {a1, b1, c1, a2, a3} instead of 9 = 3n; {a1, b1, c1, . . . , a3, b3, c3}.
We then set up the corresponding LES A˜X˜ = B˜; where A˜ is the 5×5 coefficient matrix,
X˜ is the 5× 1 variable vector and B˜ is the 5× 1 vector that represents the right-hand
side (RHS) of the LES.
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Let us now consider a second order BVP in the following form
q1(x)y
′′(x) = q2(x)y
′(x) + q3(x)y(x) + q4(x) ; y(a) = y0, y(b) = yn. (4.41)
In each small interval [xi−1, xi], Pi(x) satisfies
q1(x)P
′′
i (x)− q2(x)P ′i (x)− q3(x)Pi(x) = q4(x)
⇔ q1(x) [2ai]− q2(x) [2aix+ bi]− q3(x)
[
2aix
2 + bix+ ci
]
= q4(x)
⇔ [2q1(x)− 2q2(x)x− 2q3(x)x2] ai + [−q2(x)− q3(x)x] bi − q3(x)ci = q4(x).
We define the following short-hand notation for i = 1, . . . , n
QAi = 2q1(x¯i)− 2q2(x¯i)x¯i − 2q3(x¯i)x¯2i
QBi = −q2(x¯i)− q3(x¯i)x¯i
QCi = −q3(x¯i)
QDi = q4(x¯i),
where x¯i is the collocation point in [xi−1, xi] which, as before, we choose to be the
midpoint here, i.e. x¯i =
xi−1+xi
2
.
To set up the 5× 5 unknown coefficient matrix A˜, we use the following procedure:
The first and the last rows of the coefficient matrix come from the two boundary
conditions.
The first boundary condition, y(x0) = y0, yields that P1(x0) = y0, i.e.
a1x
2
0 + b1x0 + c1 = y0. (4.42)
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The second boundary condition, y(xn) = yn, yields that Pn(xn) = yn, i.e.
a3x
2
3 + b3x3 + c3 = a3x
2
3 + [2a1x1 + b1 + (−2x1 + 2x2) a2 − 2a3x2] x3
+
[−a1x21 + c1 + (x21 − x22) a2 + a3x22]
=
(
2x1x3 − x21
)
a1 + x3b1 + c1
+
[
(−2x1 + 2x2)x3 + x21 − x22
]
a2 +
[
x23 − 2x2x3 + x22
]
a3
= yn. (4.43)
The three remaining rows come from the fact that each Pi(x) has to satisfy the
differential equation (4.41):
If x lies in the first interval [x0, x1], we obtain
QA1a1 +QB1b1 +QC1c1 = QD1. (4.44)
If x lies in the interval [x1, x2], we obtain
QA2a2 +QB2b2 +QC2c2 = QA2a2 +QB2 [2a1x1 + b1 − 2a2x1] +QC2
[−a1x21 + c1 + a2x21]
=
[
2QB2x1 −QC2x21
]
a1 +QB2b1 +QC2c1
+
[
QA2 − 2QB2x1 +QC2x21
]
a2
= QD2. (4.45)
Finally, if x lies in the interval [x2, x3], we obtain
QA3a3 +QB3b3 +QC3c3 = QA3a3 +QB3 [2a1x1 + b1 + (−2x1 + 2x2) a2 − 2a3x2]
+QC3
[−a1x21 + c1 + (x21 − x22) a2 + a3x22]
=
[
2QB3x1 −QC3x21
]
a1 +QB3b1 +QC3c1
+
[
QB3 (−2x1 + 2x2) +QC3
(
x21 − x22
)]
a2
+
[
QA3 − 2QB3x2 +QC3x22
]
a3
= QD3. (4.46)
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From the five relationships in (4.42) - (4.46), the matrix A˜ is then determined:


x20 x0 1 0 0
QA1 QB1 QC1 0 0
2QB2x1 −QC2x21 QB2 QC2 QA2 − 2QB2x1 +QC2x21 0
2QB3x1 −QC3x21 QB3 QC3 QB3 (−2x1 + 2x2) +QC3
(
x21 − x22
)
QA3 − 2QB3x2 +QC3x22
2x1x3 − x21 x3 1 (−2x1 + 2x2)x3 + x21 − x22 x23 − 2x2x3 + x22


(4.47)
and X˜ = [a1 b1 c1 a2 a3]
T , B˜ = [y0 QD1 QD2 QD3 yn]
T .
We then solve the LES by setting X˜ = A˜−1B˜. Once X˜ is determined, the equations in
(4.35), (4.36), (4.39) and (4.40) can be used to compute b2, c2, b3 and c3 respectively.
We can eventually identify all nine of the unknown coefficients.
It is obvious that if n is large, the procedure for writing the dependent variables
{bi, ci : i = 2, . . . , n} in terms of the independent variables {a1, b1, c1, a2, a3, . . . , an}
is not easy. Taking advantage of matrix algebra makes this procedure easier. This is
illustrated in the following.
Continuing with the case n = 3, we first set up the matrix that represents the
relationship among all 9 unknown coefficients {ai, bi, ci : i = 1, . . . , 3} using (4.35),
(4.36), (4.37) and (4.38). We call this matrix TRL matrix; it is shown in Figure 4.6.
In the TRL matrix (Figure 4.6), b3 and c3 are dependent variables, which can be
written as functions of a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2, a3. Computing [TRL]
2, we get the matrix
shown in Figure 4.7.
After squaring the TRL matrix, we can see from Figure 4.7 that columns 5, 6, 8
and 9 are zero. This means that b2, c2, b3 and c3 can now be written as a function
of a1, b1, c1, a2, a3. For example, from row 6, which represents c2, we obtain that
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Figure 4.6: the TRL matrix: the case when n = 3
c2 = −x21a1+ c1+ x21a2. Also, row 8, which represents the unknown b3, indicates that
b3 = 2x1a1+b1+(−2x1+2x2)a2−2x2a3. We can then eliminate these zero columns to
get a new matrix representing the relationship among all unknown coefficients called
RelMat matrix as shown in Figure 4.8. This matrix tells us how to write all variables
in term of independent variables. We will use the RelMat matrix to construct the 5
unknowns LES.
Since Pi(x), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is determined by the three values ai, bi and ci,
in order to construct each Pi(x) we need 3 consecutive rows in the RelMat matrix:
rows 3i− 2 to 3i, which represent ai, bi and ci.
Let RelMat(i, :) denote the i-th row of the RelMat matrix. The first and the last
row of the coefficient matrix A˜ come from the boundary conditions. The first boundary
condition provides P1(x0) = y0 ⇒ a1x20 + b1x0 + c1 = y0. We know that a1, b1 and
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Figure 4.7: the [TRL]2 matrix: the case when n = 3
c1 are represented by RelMat(1, :), RelMat(2, :) and RelMat(3, :) respectively. (See
Figure 4.8). Hence,
a1x
2
0 + b1x0 + c1 = y0
⇒ x20 [RelMat(1, :)] + x0 [RelMat(2, :)] +RelMat(3, :) = y0. (4.48)
The second boundary condition provides Pn(xn) = yn ⇒ a3x23 + b3x3 + c3 =
yn. The coefficients a3, b3 and c3 are represented by RelMat(7, :), RelMat(8, :) and
RelMat(9, :). We therefore get
a3x
2
3 + b3x3 + c3 = yn
⇒ x23 [RelMat(7, :)] + x3 [RelMat(8, :)] +RelMat(9, :) = yn. (4.49)
The three remaining rows come from the differential equation (4.41) which leads to
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Figure 4.8: the RelMat matrix: the case when n = 3
QAiai +QBibi +QCici = QDi ; i = 1, . . . , 3, i.e.
QA1 [RelMat(1, :)] +QB1 [RelMat(2, :)] +QC1 [RelMat(3, :)] = QD1 (4.50)
QA2 [RelMat(4, :)] +QB2 [RelMat(5, :)] +QC2 [RelMat(6, :)] = QD2 (4.51)
QA3 [RelMat(7, :)] +QB3 [RelMat(8, :)] +QC3 [RelMat(9, :)] = QD3.(4.52)
Using the five relations (4.48) - (4.52) and the RelMat matrix in Figure 4.8, the
coefficient matrix A˜ will then be constructed, leading to the same matrix shown in
(4.47).
In general, reducing the size of the LES from 3n to n+2 unknowns can be done in
the following manner:
• Set up the 3n × 3n TRL matrix (Figure 4.9) by using the fact that at each
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common point, the values and the first derivatives from the left and the right
are equal, that is, for i = 1, . . . , (n− 1), we obtain that
bi+1 = 2aixi + bi − 2ai+1xi
ci+1 = −aix2i + ci + ai+1x2i .
In this matrix, ai, bi, ci ← f(a1, b1, c1, . . . , ai−1, bi−1, ci−1, ai) ; i = 1, . . . , n.
• Compute [TRL]n−1
one multiplication produces the matrix which for i = 1, . . . , n; ai, bi, ci ←
f(a1, b1, c1, . . . , ai−2, bi−2, ci−2, ai−1, ai). That is, every time we do the multipli-
cation, the independent variables will be reduced by 2. So in order to reduce
3n unknowns to n + 2 unknowns, we need n − 1 multiplications. In this way,
a 3n × 3n matrix in which the columns representing bi, ci; i = 2, . . . , n are zero
will be obtained.
• Obtain a 3n× (n+ 2) RelMat matrix by
eliminating all zero columns in [TRL]n−1 that were obtained in the previous
step.
• Construct an (n+ 2)× (n+ 2) coefficient matrix A˜ by
- first row:
x20 [RelMat(1, :)] + x0 [RelMat(2, :)] +RelMat(3, :)
- last row:
x2n [RelMat(3n− 2, :)] + xn [RelMat(3n− 1, :)] +RelMat(3n, :)
- n remaining rows: for i = 1, . . . , n, set
QAi [RelMat(3i− 2, :)] +QBi [RelMat(3i− 1, :)] +QCiRelMat(3i, :)
Chapter 4 121
• Construct an (n+ 2)× 1 RHS vector B˜
- first element of B˜ is y0
- last element of B˜ is yn
- elements in remaining rows are from the corresponding QDi
• An (n+ 2)× 1 unknown vector X˜ is [a1 b1 c1 a2 a3 . . . an]T .
Once X˜ is determined, by solving X˜ = A˜−1B˜, we can get back all of the 3n unknown
variables X = [a1 b1 c1 . . . an bn cn]
T from the equation
X = (RelMat) X˜.
Figure 4.9: the TRL Matrix
122 Walailuck Chavanasporn
4.4. Applying Cubic Splines for Solving Stochastic Optimal Control
Problems
Recall that Theorem 4.2 showed that under some conditions the equality of the
second order derivatives at the threshold holds in stochastic optimal control problems
which are linear in control. We can take the advantage of this property to use cubic
splines to approximate the solutions of the problems instead of quadratic ones, from
which higher accuracy can be expected. The idea of applying cubic splines to solve
the stochastic optimal control problem is analogous to the case of quadratic splines
but we use cubic polynomials to interpolate the solution of the given BVP. As a result,
we have to deal with 4n unknowns LES instead of 3n unknowns LES.
We will illustrate our approach using the same example indicated in the quadratic
interpolation part. We need to solve equation (4.11) and (4.12) subject to (4.8),
(4.9) and (4.10). The idea to use cubic splines to solve this free BVP is as follows.
First, we discretise the state space, x, into n small intervals of equal length. For
j = 1, . . . , (n − 1), we suppose that x∗ = xj, which is one of the grid points of x.
Then, we use the cubic polynomial Pi(x) = aix
3+ bix
2+ cix+ di to interpolate V (x),
when x ∈ [xi−1, xi] for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Next, we set up the 4n unknowns linear
equations system (LES), AX = B, where A is 4n× 4n coefficient matrix. The vector
X = [a1 b1 c1 d1 . . . an bn cn dn]
T is a 4n × 1 unknown coefficient matrix and
the vector B is a 4n× 1 matrix representing the right-hand side (RHS) of the LES.
The 4n conditions needed to construct the matrix A are
(i) the continuity of Pi(x) at common points,
(ii) the first order differentiability of Pi(x) at common points,
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Figure 4.10: Numerical idea for solving the problem
(iii) the second order differentiability of Pi(x) at common points,
(iv) the two boundary conditions,
(v) all Pi(x) have to satisfy the given differential equation.
The first three conditions give 3(n − 1) equations, the fourth one provides 2
equations and the condition (v) gives n additional equations. Since V (x) consists
of two parts, namely V0(x), which follows (4.11), and Vk(x), which follows (4.12),
we need to divide the n equations obtained from condition (v) into two parts.
The first part, for all xi ≤ xj, we use the differential equation (4.11) to construct
the relations while the second part, for all xi > xj, we use equation (4.12)
instead of (4.11). Note here that xj is now taking the role of x
∗. Now we have
3(n− 1) + 2 + n = 4n− 1 conditions. One further condition is needed here, so
that we can uniquely identify all unknowns. This extra condition is:
(vi) the third order derivative at the left boundary is zero, i.e. P ′′′1 (x0) = 0.
The unknown coefficient matrix can be easily computed by X = A−1B.
Before we continue to the discussion of how to obtain the optimal threshold x∗, let
us consider the way to reduce the size of the LES. As was already mentioned in Section
4.3, if we use a very fine discretising grid, we will face a huge LES and of course it
takes time to obtain the result. It would be better if we apply the cubic polynomial
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interpolation integrating with the idea of a dimension reduction. After reducing the
size of the matrix, the LES will be reduced from 4n unknowns to n+3 unknowns. This
means that the size of the coefficient matrix which we need to compute the inverse
every time we want to test for the threshold x∗ is reduced to (n + 3)× (n + 3). The
number of elements in the coefficient matrix is therefore reduced by a factor (4n)
2
(n+3)2
.
The idea of a dimension reduction is analogous to the quadratic polynomial case,
that is, we first find the relations of dependent variables bi, ci, di, for i = 2, 3, . . . , n in
terms of the independent variables a1, b1, c1, d1, a2, a3, . . . , an, by using the properties
of continuity and first and second order differentiability of Pi(x) at the common points
xi for i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
To demonstrate this idea, let Pi(x) = aix
3+ bix
2+ cix+di be the cubic polynomial
interpolant to V (x); x ∈ [xi−1, xi] , i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
At every xi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, the following properties hold.
Pi(xi) = Pi+1(xi)
P ′i (xi) = P
′
i+1(xi)
P ′′i (xi) = P
′′
i+1(xi)
These relations lead to the following equations. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, we have that
aix
3
i + bix
2
i + cixi + di = ai+1x
3
i + bi+1x
2
i + ci+1xi + di+1
3aix
2
i + 2bixi + ci = 3ai+1x
2
i + 2bi+1xi + ci+1
6aixi + 2bi = 6ai+1xi + 2bi+1.
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These properties yield
bi+1 = 3aixi + bi − 3ai+1xi (4.53)
ci+1 = −3aix2i + ci + 3ai+1x2i (4.54)
di+1 = aix
3
i + di − ai+1x3i . (4.55)
Using the same procedures as in the quadratic polynomial case, we begin by
constructing the 4n × 4n matrix to identify the relationships among all unknown
coefficients {ai, bi, ci, di, i = 1, . . . , n}. We will call this matrix the TRL matrix and it
is constructed using the relations (4.53) - (4.55). The matrix TRL is shown in Figure
4.11. Then find a new 4n× (n+3) matrix called RelMat by first computing [TRL]n−1
and then eliminating all zero columns. Once RelMat matrix is obtained, we are ready
to construct (n+3) unknowns LES, A˜X˜ = B˜, where A˜ is an (n+3)×(n+3) coefficient
matrix, the vector X˜ = [a1 b1 c1 d1 a2 a3 . . . an]
T contains the (n+3) unknown
coefficients and the vector B˜ is an (n+3)×1 matrix representing the RHS of the LES.
To set up the matrix A˜, we follow the same procedure as in the quadratic polynomial
case. That is, the matrix is obtained from the fact that the second order BVP (4.41),
in each small interval [xi−1, xi], Pi(x) satisfies
q1(x)P
′′
i (x)− q2(x)P ′i (x)− q3(x)Pi(x) = q4(x)
⇔ q1(x) [6aix+ 2bi]− q2(x)
[
3aix
2 + 2bix+ ci
]− q3(x) [aix3 + bix2 + cix+ di] = q4(x)
⇔ [6q1(x)x− 3q2(x)x2 − q3(x)x3] ai + [2q1(x)− 2q2(x)x− q3(x)x2] bi
+ [−q2(x)− q3(x)x] ci − q3(x)di = q4(x).
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As before, we define the following short-hand notation for each i = 1, . . . , n.
CQAi = 6q1(x¯i)x¯i − 3q2(x¯i)x¯2i − q3(x¯i)x¯3i
CQBi = 2q1(x¯i)− 2q2(x¯i)x¯i − q3(x¯i)x¯2i
CQCi = −q2(x¯i)− q3(x¯i)x¯i
CQDi = −q3(x¯i)
CQEi = q4(x¯i),
where x¯i is the collocation point in [xi−1, xi].
Figure 4.11: Numerical idea for solving the problem
Since Pi(x) for i = 1, . . . , n is determined by the four variables ai, bi, ci and di, four
consecutive rows in the RelMat matrix, row 4i− 3 to row 4i, are needed in order to
construct each Pi(x).
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Using the same notation as in the quadratic polynomial interpolation part, let
RelMat(i, :) denote the i-th row with all columns of the RelMat matrix. Each of the
rows of the (n+3)×(n+3) coefficient matrix A˜ are set up by the following procedure:
(i) The first row is devoted to the extra condition:
P ′′′1 (x0) = 0 ⇒ 6a1 = 0 ⇒ a1 = 0, i.e.
RelMat(1, :) = 0
(ii) The second row is given by the first boundary conditon:
P1(x0) = y0 ⇒ a1x30 + b1x20 + c1x0 + d1 = y0.
We know that the values a1, b1, c1 and d1 are represented by RelMat(1, :),
RelMat(2, :), RelMat(3, :) and RelMat(4, :) respectively. Therefore
a1x
3
0 + b1x
2
0 + c1x0 + d1 = y0
⇒ x30 [RelMat(1, :)] + x20 [RelMat(2, :)]
+x0 [RelMat(3, :)] +RelMat(4, :) = y0.
(iii) The last row comes from the second boundary condition:
Pn(xn) = yn ⇒ anx3n + bnx2n + cnxn + dn = yn.
Since the coefficients an, bn, cn and dn are represented by RelMat(4n − 3, :),
RelMat(4n− 2, :), RelMat(4n− 1, :) and RelMat(4n, :), we get
anx
3
n + bnx
2
n + cnxn + dn = yn
⇒ x3n [RelMat(4n− 3, :)] + x2n [RelMat(4n− 2, :)]
+xn [RelMat(4n− 1, :)] +RelMat(4n, :) = yn.
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(iv) The n remaining rows come from the differential equation (4.41) leading to
CQAiai + CQBibi + CQCici + CQDidi = QEi ; i = 1, . . . , n, i.e.
CQAi [RelMat(4i− 3, :)] + CQBi [RelMat(4i− 2, :)]
+CQCi [RelMat(4i− 1, :)] + CQDi [RelMat(4i, :)] = QEi.
The elements in a (n+3)× 1 RHS vector B˜ are formed by the corresponding RHS
of all relations setting above that is B˜ = [0 y0 CQE1 . . . CQEn yn]
T while an
(n+ 3)× 1 unknown vector X˜ is equal to [a1 b1 c1 d1 a2 a3 . . . an]T . Once again
after X˜ is determined, by X˜ = A˜−1B˜, we can easily get all 4n unknown variables in
the vector X = [a1 b1 c1 d1 . . . an bn cn dn]
T back, by setting
X = (RelMat) X˜.
Now let us return to the problem of finding the optimal threshold x∗. The threshold
can be found by first supposing that x∗ = xj for each j = 1, . . . , (n−1) and then solving
the corresponding LES. Once all unknown coefficients {ai, bi, ci, di, i = 1, . . . , n} are
determined, we compute the error at xj by
err(xj) =
∣∣(3aj+1x2j + 2bj+1xj + cj+1)− 1∣∣ .4 (4.56)
The optimal threshold x∗ can be found by setting x∗ = xj such that min
j
{err(xj)}.
The equation (4.56) is obtained from (4.10) and Pi(x) = aix
3 + bix
2 + cix+ di.
Using the same parameter values as in the analytic solution section, we obtain
results for different levels of discretisation, n, shown in Table 4.2. (Recall that the
exact value of x∗ from the previous section is 0.28376.)
4Ones can alternatively use {aj , bj , cj} instead of {aj+1, bj+1, cj+1} because at any of the common
points xi, we have that 3ajx
2
j + 2bjxj + cj = 3aj+1x
2
j + 2bj+1xj + cj+1.
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Table 4.2: Numerical Results: Cubic Polynomial Interpolation
n x∗ min
j
{err(xj)}
100 0.2800 0.005474
200 0.2850 0.001776
400 0.2850 0.001787
500 0.2840 3.410590× 10−4
We can see from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 that the result (x∗) with the same level
of discretisation are taking the same values for both quadratic and cubic polynomial
interpolations. The error from the interpolation by cubic polynomial is a bit better
than the interpolation from the quadratic polynomial. Although, in general, we would
expect the better result from cubic polynomial interpolation, in some particular cases,
quadratic polynomial interpolation provides the better one. This phenomenon has
been studied in Khalifa and Eilbeck (1981) [40]. They found that if the first order
derivative terms in the differential equation are not too large, the quadratic splines
give a higher accuracy than the cubic splines.
4.5. Conclusions
We have demonstrated how stochastic optimal control problems, which are linear in
the control, can be solved numerically by using quadratic splines for the approximation
of the value function. A simple but efficient algorithm has been derived and tested at
a benchmark example, which is motivated by Pindyck (1993) [61]. We then improved
the efficiency of the algorithm, by reducing the dimension of the matrices involved.
In addition, we provide a theorem showing that under some conditions, the equality
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of the second order derivative holds at the threshold. This allows us to use cubic
polynomial interpolation instead of quadratic polynomial.
Chapter 5
Privatisation of Businesses and
Flexible Investment: A Real
Option Approach
Many sectors of the economy, such as natural resources, infrastructure development
and services are (or have originally been) owned and developed by state governments.
Due to limited budgets however, governments are constrained in developing all parts of
the economy equally. Additional problems such as the inadequate use of government
budgets, lack of knowledge and insufficient experience and specialisation in managing
specific sectors occur in many developing countries. Furthermore, residents may not
receive good services from public enterprises. Many governments also lack an incentive
to run the enterprises that they own efficiently, due to the lack of competition in state
monopolies. These are reasons why, in many cases, governments have decided to
privatise businesses. As stated in Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) [45], the main reasons to
opt for privatisation are the belief that private companies can make more efficient use
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of assets than governments can and that governments at least partially profit from
the higher revenues that privatisation creates.
Even though full privatisation has been taken place in many cases, especially in the
services sector, it may in general not be ideal for the government to always proceed
with full privatisation. Partial privatisation may be the better option, particularly in
cases such as natural resources (coal and oil) or nuclear energy. In the case of partial
privatisation the government gives a certain proportion α ∈ (0, 1) to the private
company to manage and retains the remaining (1− α) proportion.
There are many tools used to solve investment decisions problem, for instance, real
option theory and stochastic optimal control. Loosely speaking, the idea behind real
option theory is that an investor who is given an opportunity in investing into a project
basically holds a perpetual call option on the value of the business with a strike price
that is equal to the sunk costs, installment for example. Project evaluation using
real options has been studied by many authors in the past decades, see, for example,
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) [23], Ingersoll and Ross (1992) [39], McDonald and Siegel
(1986) [52], Schwartz and Trigeorgis (2004) [67]. In this chapter, we investigate the
problem of business privatisation with flexible investment in a combined real option
- stochastic optimal control framework.
Apart from finding the optimal time for the private company to enter the govern-
ment’s business, we also have to consider the stochastic optimal control problem which
occurs afterward. The private company may have other investment opportunities
and may thus choose to run the governments business with a minimal amount of
investment. At the other extreme, as the private company’s funds are limited, the
private company’s maximum investment rate is also limited. For simplicity we will
later assume that the private company’s investment rate at time t is given by u(t) ∈
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[0, k] with k > 0 denoting the maximum investment rate.
Mathematically, we attach a state variable to the business project, which we denote
by x(t). In the classical real option setup, this variable usually refers to the value of the
business. In some contexts however it can be useful to think of x(t) as representing
the level of development or advancement of a business project. Here we will take
the latter perspective. As many other authors do, we assume that x(t) follows a
geometric mean reversion process. This process features mean-reverting returns and
is well documented in the real option literature.
As mentioned above, our investment decision problem consists of two parts. The
company is first looking for the optimal time to enter the government’s business and
afterward is trying to find the optimal dynamic strategy in terms of the amount of
investment. To solve the first part of the problem, we follow the standard approach
of real option theory and determine the optimal threshold, which determines when
the private company should enter the government’s business. For the second part, we
have to deal with a stochastic optimal control problem. Due to the complexity of the
modelling framework, we will not be able to solve this part analytically. Instead we
apply the numerical method described in the previous chapter for solving a stochastic
optimal control problem with linear control, using quadratic splines to approximate
the value function.
In our model, the degree of privatisation, which is described by the parameter
α, can be determined by the government. From the government’s point of view,
it is important to determine correctly the value of α so that the optimal degree of
privatisation is chosen. The optimal government share-holding in privatised businesses
has been studied by various authors. For example, Chen et al. (2009) [17] used a
mixed oligopoly model to explore how the government determines the percentage of
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shares of state owned banks in China to be released to foreign investors under the
objective of maximising social welfare. Fluck, John and Ravid (1996) [29] examine
the optimisation problem in a privatisation problem for three different cases of the
proportion of the private ownership, α = 0 (full nationalisation), α = 0.49 (51% owned
by the government and 49% owned by private investors), and α = 1 (full privatisa-
tion). Moreover, Matsumura (1998) [49] investigates a case of partial privatisation in
mixed duopoly while Huang, Lee and Chen (2006) [38] study the optimal government
shareholding strategy in a mixed oligopoly framework. One interesting result from
the latter two articles is that neither full privatisation (α = 1) nor full nationalisation
(α = 0) is optimal. In our model, we will observe that partial privatisation within the
range from 30% to 50% is optimal from the government’s point of view.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.1, we set up our
model, leading to a combined optimal stopping - stochastic optimal control problem,
which we solve in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we present our numerical results
and include a discussion on the optimal choice of the degree of privatisation for the
government. We summarise our conclusions in Section 5.4.
5.1. Investment Model
We study the situation where a private company is given the opportunity to enter
a government run business. At the time of entry the private company obtains a
proportion α ∈ (0, 1) of the business in return for an installment cost I, which is
sunk. The remaining proportion (1 − α) remains with the government. The private
company has to decide upon the optimal time to enter the business. After entry, the
private company can choose its investment rate flexibly within a given range [0, k].
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The optimisation problem of the private company is given as:
V (x) = max
τ1,u∈[0,k]
E
[∫ τ2
τ1
e−rtB(x(t))dt+ e−rτ2S(x(τ2))− e−rτ1I
]
(5.1)
subject to
dx(t) = (µ− δx(t))x(t)dt+ σx(t)dW1(t), x(0) = x; 0 < t < τ1 (5.2)
dx(t) = (u(t)− δx(t))x(t)dt+ σx(t)dW1(t) + γ
√
u(t)dW2(t), x(0) = x; τ1 ≤ t < τ2.
(5.3)
Here B(x) denotes the benefits the private company obtains while running the
business, while S(x) denotes the benefits it obtains upon termination. The latter
occurs at time τ2 which we assume to be of type
τ2 := inf {t|x(t) ≤ 0, x(t) ≥ x˜} .
We interpret the case of x(t) ≤ 0 as the case where the private company has ruined
the governments project, in which case it will receive a penalty. The case of x(t) ≥ x˜
on the other hand will be interpreted as the case where the project is fully completed,
and the private company receives a final reward.
Before the private company enters the business at time τ1, the dynamics describing
the state of the business, denoted by x(t) ∈ [0, x˜], is assumed to follow (5.2). During
this period, t < τ1, the business is entirely undertaken by the state government and,
as such, no benefits are received by the private company. The parameter µ stands for
the government’s contribution to the business while δ denotes its depreciation rate.
We assume µ > δ > 0. The parameter σ > 0 denotes the volatility of the business
and W1(t) stands for a standard Wiener process.
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Once the private company enters the business at time τ1, the company has to pay
an installment fee I > 0 to the government. These are sunk costs. The dynamics
describing the state of the business then changes and follows (5.3) until time τ2.
During the period the company is running the business, that is τ1 < t < τ2, it
maintains a flexible investment rate u(t) ∈ [0, k]. It is well known that investment
can also generate uncertainty. This feature is included in our model by means of a
second Wiener process W2(t), which for simplicity is assumed to be independent of
W1(t). The parameter γ > 0 models the intensity of this effect.
Between time τ1 and τ2, the private company accumulates benefits at the rate B(x)
until the project terminates at time τ2, when the private company will receive S(x(τ2))
as the terminal payoff.
We need to solve the dynamic optimisation problem (5.1)-(5.3) backwards in time.
Let Vb(x) and Va(x) be the optimal value functions before and after the company
enters the business, respectively. Following the standard real option approach, the
company will enter the business when a certain investment threshold x∗b is reached.
At this threshold the so-called value matching condition (5.4) and smooth pasting
condition (5.5) have to be satisfied.
Vb(x
∗
b) = Va(x
∗
b)− I (5.4)
V ′b (x
∗
b) = V
′
a(x
∗
b) (5.5)
5.2. Solving the Problem
In this section we derive the differential equations that determine the solution of
the optimisation problem (5.1) − (5.3) and discuss how to solve them. As indicated
before, we will have to solve the optimal investment problem backward in time, that
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is, solve for Va(x) first. Once Va(x) is obtained, we will then solve for Vb(x) and the
threshold x∗b . In order to obtain a tractable model, we assume that the benefits the
private company receives between τ1 and τ2 are given by B(x(t)) = αx(t)−u(t). The
expression αx(t) represents the benefits the company receives as the proportion of the
business owned by the company, while u(t) represents the cost from investing. The
payoff S(x(t)) that the company obtains upon termination is assumed to be of type
S(x) =


−C ; if x = 0
βx(t) ; if x = x˜.
The intuition behind the terminal payoff is that if the value of the business x(t)
falls to zero, the company takes responsibility for destroying the business and receives
a penalty C > 0. On the other hand, if the business is successfully completed, the
company will be rewarded with a proportion β of the business.
Using the specific forms for B(x) and S(x) above, the corresponding Bellman
equation reads
rVa(x) = max
u∈[0,k]
{
(u− δx)xV ′a(x) +
1
2
σ2x2V ′′a (x) +
1
2
γ2uV ′′a (x) + αx− u
}
, (5.6)
with the two boundary conditions Va(0) = −C and Va(x˜) = βx˜ imposed.
Since (5.6) is linear in u, the rate of investment that maximises Va(x) is either zero
or k:
u∗ =


k ; γ
2
2
V ′′a (x) + xV
′
a(x)− 1 ≥ 0
0 ; otherwise
. (5.7)
Let Va0(x) and Vak(x) denote the value function when the company invests 0 and k
respectively. At the optimal threshold x∗a that determines when the private company
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switches between 0 and k we must have
Va0(x
∗
a) = Vak(x
∗
a) (5.8)
V ′a0(x
∗
a) = V
′
ak(x
∗
a) (5.9)
0 =
γ2
2
V ′′a (x
∗
a) + x
∗
aV
′
a(x
∗
a)− 1. (5.10)
Equation (5.8) is called the value matching condition, while equation (5.9) is called
smooth pasting condition. Equation (5.10) represents the condition that guarantees
that the control is optimal at the threshold x∗a. The optimal investment strategy for
the private company is then to invest k if x ≥ x∗a; and invest 0 if x < x∗a.
Substituting u∗ into equation (5.6), the Bellman equations for Va0(x) and Vak(x)
are given respectively by
rVa0(x) = (−δx)xV ′a0(x) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′a0(x) + αx (5.11)
rVak(x) = (k − δx)xV ′ak(x) +
σ2x2 + γ2k
2
V ′′ak(x) + αx− k (5.12)
with boundary conditions
Va0(0) = −C (5.13)
and Vak(x˜) = βx˜. (5.14)
In order to find Va(x), which comprises the two parts Va0(x) for x < x
∗
a and
Vak(x) for x > x
∗
a, we apply the numerical method for solving stochastic optimal
control problem with linear control introduced in the previous chapter. Following
this approach, we interpolate the value function on a discrete grid by quadratic spline
functions.
Chapter 5 139
Figure 5.1: Using quadratic polynomials to interpolate the solution of the problem
We are solving the free boundary-value problem (5.11) for x < x∗a and (5.12) for
x > x∗a with the boundary conditions (5.13) and (5.14), where x ∈ [0, x˜], by using
quadratic splines. We first discretise the state space x into n equally sized small
intervals. Let Pi(x) = aix
2 + bix + ci be the quadratic polynomial that is used
to approximate Va(x) in each of the subintervals [xi−1, xi], for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. For
j = 1, . . . , n−1, we suppose that x∗a = xj is one of the grid points. We next construct
a system of n+ 2 linear equations A˜X˜ = B˜, where A˜ is an (n+ 2)× (n+ 2) matrix,
X˜ denotes an (n + 2)-vector which contains the unknown (independent) coefficients
[a1 b1 c1 a2 a3 . . . an]
T and B˜ is an (n+ 2)-vector representing the corresponding
right-hand side of the linear equations system.
Let us now describe the procedures used to set up the (n+ 2)× (n+ 2) matrix A˜.
(i) Set up the 3n × 3n matrix TRL that corresponds to the spline interpolation
problem, by using the fact that at each common point, the values and the first
derivatives from the left and the right are equal, i.e. for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, we
have that
aix
2
i + bixi + ci = ai+1x
2
i + bi+1xi + ci+1
2aixi + bi = 2ai+1xi + bi+1
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which leads to
bi+1 = 2aixi + bi − 2ai+1xi
ci+1 = −aix2i + ci + ai+1x2i .
These relations are used to construct the TRL matrix as shown in Figure
5.2. We observe from the figure that for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have that
ai, bi, ci ← f(a1, b1, c1, . . . , ai−1, bi−1, ci−1, ai). In other words, they are functions
of the variables a1, b1, c1, . . . , ai−1, bi−1, ci−1, ai.
(ii) Computing [TRL]n−1 results in a 3n×3n matrix where the columns representing
bi, ci for i = 2, . . . , n are zero. Elimination of all those zero columns in [TRL]
n−1
yields a 3n × (n + 2) matrix, which we denote by RelMat. Using RelMat, all
3n unknown coefficients can be written as functions of the (n+ 2) independent
variables ai, bi, ci ← f(a1, b1, c1, a2, a3 . . . , an); i = 1, . . . , n.
(iii) Next, construct an (n+2)×(n+2) matrix A˜. The quadratic polynomial Pi(x) for
each i = 1, . . . , n corresponds to the three unknown variables ai, bi, ci, which are
represented by the three consecutive rows 3i− 2 to row 3i in RelMat. Denoting
by [RelMat(i, :)] the i-th row of RelMat, we find that
• first row: (from the first boundary condition (5.13))
x20 [RelMat(1, :)] + x0 [RelMat(2, :)] +RelMat(3, :)
• last row: (from the second boundary condition (5.14))
x2n [RelMat(3n− 2, :)] + xn [RelMat(3n− 1, :)] +RelMat(3n, :)
Now we proceed with constructing the n remaining rows, row 2 to row n + 1,
which are determined by the fact that all polynomials Pi(x) must satisfy one
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of the two differential equations (5.11) and (5.12), respectively, depending on
whether x is below or above x∗a. Since Va consists of two parts Va0 and Vak, we
have to divide these n rows into two groups depending on where the current xj
lies. Note that xj here is taking the role of x
∗
a. For the first group, rows 2 to
j + 1 (for all xi ≤ xj), we use the differential equation (5.11) to construct the
relations while for the second group, rows j+2 to n+1 (for all xi > xj), we use
the differential equation (5.12). We use x¯i =
xi−1+xi
2
as collocation points.
Using the quadratic polynomial Pi(x) to interpolate Va(x) in the small interval
[xi−1, xi] we obtain from equation (5.11)
r
(
aix¯
2
i + bix¯i + ci
)
+ δx¯2i (2aix¯i + bi)−
σ2x¯2i
2
(2ai) = αx¯i
⇔ [r + 2δx¯i − σ2] x¯2i ai + [r + δx¯i] x¯ibi + rci = αx¯i. (5.15)
On the other hand, we obtain from equation (5.12) that
r
(
aix¯
2
i + bix¯i + ci
)− (k − δx¯i) x¯i (2aix¯i + bi)− (σ2x¯2i + γ2k
2
)
(2ai) = αx¯i − k
⇔ [rx¯2i − 2 (k − δx¯i) x¯2i − σ2x¯2i − γ2k] ai + [rx¯i − (k − δx¯i) x¯i] bi + rci = αx¯i − k
⇔ [(r − 2k + 2δx¯i − σ2) x¯i − γ2k] ai + [r − k + δx¯i] x¯ibi + rci = αx¯i − k.(5.16)
Hence, the n remaining rows of A˜ are given by:
• rows 2 to j + 1 , for i = 1, . . . , j; (from the left-hand side of (5.15))
[
r + 2δx¯i − σ2
]
x¯2i [RelMat(3i− 2, :)]+[r + δx¯i] x¯i [RelMat(3i− 1, :)]+r [RelMat(3i, :)]
• rows j +2 to n+1 , for i = j +1, . . . , n; (from the left-hand side of (5.16))
[(
r − 2k + 2δx¯i − σ2
)
x¯i − γ2k
]
[RelMat(3i− 2, :)]
+ [r − k + δx¯i] x¯i [RelMat(3i− 1, :)] +r [RelMat(3i, :)]
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Figure 5.2: the Matrix TRL
The vector B˜ which represents the right-hand side of the linear equation system is
constructed as follows:
• the first element of B˜ is −C (from the first boundary condition (5.13))
• the last element of B˜ is βx˜ (from the second boundary condition (5.14))
• the n remaining elements are divided into two parts
• the 2nd to (j + 1)th elements are equal to αx¯i; for i = 1, . . . , j; (from the
right-hand side of (5.15))
• the (j+2)th to (n+1)th elements are equal to αx¯i− k; for i = j+1, . . . , n;
(from the right-hand side of (5.16))
After the linear equations system A˜X˜ = B˜ is set up, we compute the (n + 2)
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unknown variable vector X˜ = [a1 b1 c1 a2 a3 . . . an]
T via
X˜ = A˜−1B˜.
The original 3n unknown variables X = [a1 b1 c1 . . . an bn cn]
T can be re-
trieved via
X = (RelMat) X˜.
Once X is obtained, for each xj, we choose the one that gives the best estimate for
x∗a, taking an error measurement err2(xj) into account which is derived as follows.
The equation that is used to check whether xj is sufficiently close to x
∗
a is equation
(5.10). Since we interpolate Va(x) by Pi(x) = aix
2+ bix+ ci, equation (5.10) becomes
γ2
2
V ′′a (x
∗
a) + x
∗
aV
′
a(x
∗
a)− 1 =
γ2
2
(2ai) + (2aix
∗
a + bi)x
∗
a − 1
=
[
γ2 + 2(x∗a)
2
]
ai + x
∗
abi − 1 (5.17)
= 0.
If xj is sufficiently close to x
∗
a, it has to satisfy (5.17) in approximation. As a result,
the threshold x∗a can be approximated by the xj that minimises
err2(xj) =
∣∣(γ2 + 2x2j) ai + xjbi − 1∣∣ .1 (5.18)
Once Va(x) is determined, we then solve for Vb(x), the value function before the
private company enters the business, and the optimal threshold x∗b for the adoption
by using constraint (5.2) with the two free boundary conditions (5.4) and (5.5). The
corresponding Bellman equation is given by
rVb(x) = (µ− δx)xV ′b (x) +
1
2
σ2x2V ′′b (x). (5.19)
1Alternatively one can use {aj+1, bj+1} instead of {aj , bj} because at any common point
xi, 2aixi + bi = 2ai+1xi + bi+1.
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This problem is essentially the same as the classical real option problem discussed in
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and also the optimisation problem in Chapter 3 in geometric
mean reversion based model, except that the value matching conditions are coming
from Va(x). Nevertheless, the derivation of the general form of the value function
before τ1 is completely analogous to the problems described above. Since we have
demonstrated the detail of how to solve this model in Chapter 3, we will not include
all the details here. Only the solution will be shown.
According to the result from the problem based on geometric mean reversion case,
the solution of (5.19) is given by
Vb(x) = Ax
βM
(
β,
2µ
σ2
+ 2β,
2δ
σ2
x
)
, (5.20)
where A is a constant that is yet to be determined,
β =
−(µ− 1
2
σ2) +
√
(µ− 1
2
σ2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
, (5.21)
and M(a, b, z) denotes the Kummer’s M function.
This solution implies, in the light of the free boundary conditions (5.4) and (5.5),
that
Ax
∗β
b M
(
β,
2µ
σ2
+ 2β,
2δ
σ2
x∗b
)
= Va(x
∗
b)− I (5.22)
and
Ax
∗β
b
2βδ
2µ+ 2βσ2
M
(
β + 1,
2µ
σ2
+ 2β + 1,
2δ
σ2
x∗b
)
+βAx
∗(β−1)
b M
(
β,
2µ
σ2
+ 2β,
2δ
σ2
x∗b
)
= V ′a(x
∗
b).
(5.23)
Since Va(x) is obtained by quadratic polynomial interpolation, i.e., Va(x) = aix
2 +
bix+ ci; x ∈ [xi−1, xi], we have to replace its derivative for x ∈ [xi−1, xi] by
V ′a(x) = 2aix+ bi.
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To obtain Vb(x) and x
∗
b , we now proceed as follows. For each xj ∈ {x0 = 0, x1, x2, . . . , xn =
x˜}, we compute A by using equation (5.22), that is,
A =
Va(xj)− I
x
β
jM(β,
2µ
σ2
+ 2β, 2δ
σ2
xj)
.
Substituting A into equation (5.23), computing the difference between the left-hand
side and the right-hand side and denoting it by err1(xj), the threshold x
∗
b can be
found by choosing the xj that minimises err1(xj).
5.3. Numerical Results
This section contains some results from our numerical experiments. These are based
on the approach developed in the previous section. We include two subsections. The
first subsection consists of an example for a given set of parameters, with fixed degree
of privatisation α. In the second subsection, we introduce an objective functional
for the government and study its decision problem of finding the optimal degree of
privatisation α∗.
5.3.1. An Example
For the purpose of illustration, we choose the following parameters: r = 0.04, µ =
0.1, δ = 0.05, α = 0.1, β = 0.7, σ = 0.15, γ = 0.2, k = 0.5, C = 0.2, I = 0.5 and x˜ = 1.
Figure 5.3 displays the value functions Vb(x) and Va(x), as a function of the state of
the business x. In the figure, the dashed line represents Vb(x), the private company’s
value function before entering the privatised business, whereas the solid line represents
Va(x)−I, the company’s value function after investing in the business minus the sunk
installment costs the company needs to pay when the company enters the business.
Our simulation shows that it is optimal for the private company to enter when the
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threshold x∗b = 0.6960 is reached. In addition, it is optimal for the private company
to invest with the maximum rate k when x is greater than the threshold x∗a = 0.0180
and invest zero if x is less than the threshold x∗a.
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Figure 5.3: Value functions of the company before, Vb(x), and after, Va(x), it adopts the
business
5.3.2. The Optimal Degree of Privatisation
In the earlier sections we took the private company’s perspective and answered the
question when is it optimal for the private company to enter the business and how an
optimal dynamic investment strategy after entry should be chosen. In this subsection,
we consider the government’s decision making about how to chose the optimal degree
of privatisation, in our model the parameter α, which denotes the ownership share
of the business that belong to the private company. The parameter α affects the
thresholds x∗b and x
∗
a as well as the value functions Vb and Va and therefore the private
company’s investment behavior. The government, having complete information about
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the private company’s objectives, would want to set α in such a way that its own
benefits are optimised. Including this feature, we essentially end up with a two-
player sequential game with complete information. This can be solved by backward
induction. Note that we have in fact solved the final stage in the previous sections.
As the government’s objective function, we choose
E
[∫ τ1
0
x(t)dt+
∫ τ2
τ1
(1− α)x(t)dt+ e−rτ1I + (D −Bτ 22 )
]
. (5.24)
The intuition behind (5.24) is as follows. Until time τ1, that is, prior to partial
privatisation, the government receives the full benefits from the project, while from
time τ1 until time τ2, that is, after partial privatisation until completion, it receives
the share 1 − α. The government also receives the installment costs I at time τ1.
Further to this, the government has a preference for the project to be completed
as quickly as possible. This can be economically or politically motivated.2 This
objective is modeled by the last term in (5.24), where B and D are appropriately
chosen constants.
In order to evaluate the latter expression, we use Monte Carlo simulation and a
sufficiently small time discretisation. To generate paths for the state variable x(t)
we use the Euler-Maruyama method, taking into account the optimal investment
behavior by the private company determined in the previous sections. That is, for
t < τ1, we discretise
x(t+∆t) = x(t) + (µ− δx(t))x(t)∆t+ σx(t)∆W1 , x(0) = x0, (5.25)
and for τ1 < t < τ2
x(t+∆t) = x(t) + (u(t)− δx(t))x(t)∆t+ σx(t)∆W1 + γ
√
u(t)∆W2, (5.26)
2For example completion of the project prior to elections.
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respectively.
For each value of α, we determine the two thresholds, x∗b for entry and x
∗
a for
investment, and choosing an initial value x0 < x
∗
b , we simulate x(t), using (5.25) and
(5.26). In this way we generate a large number of paths, evaluate the term inside the
expectation in (5.24), and then take the average value as an approximation for its
expectation.
Note here that equation (5.26) is the discrete approximation of the value of the
business x(t) for τ1 < t < τ2, which is when the private company is running the
business. During this period, the company has to make a decision on u(t) which
stands for the investment rate in the related project. Therefore, in the simulation of
equation (5.26), u(t) takes the value 0 if x < x∗a and the value k if x ≥ x∗a.
For the purpose of illustration, we choose the following parameters: r = 0.04,
µ = 0.25, δ = 0.1, β = 0.7, σ = 0.1, γ = 0.15, k = 0.5, C = 0.2, I = 0.5, x˜ = 1,
B = 20 and D = 300. In the simulation, we discretise α via α = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9.
Figure 5.4 shows the the governments expected utility as a function of α.
It can be observed that from the governments perspective the optimal degree of
privatisation is given by α ≈ 0.3, even though the values obtained from any α in the
range α ∈ [0.3, 0.5] are all very close to each other. This suggests an optimal degree
of privatisation of 30% to 50%, which seems to be a realistic figure.
5.4. Conclusions
We have studied the situation where a private company is given the opportunity
to invest at a flexible rate into a state-owned business. We computed thresholds
that determine the optimal time for the private company to enter the business and
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Figure 5.4: Expected utility for the government from different degrees of privatisation.
afterwards follows an optimal dynamic investment strategy. In order to achieve this,
we approximated the value function using quadratic spline functions. Additionally,
we studied the relationship between the degree of privatisation α and the expected
government benefits and determined the optimal degree of privatisation. Under a
specific set of parameter values, the simulations show that it is optimal for the
government to use the degree of privatisation of 30% to 50%.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we study applications of stochastic differential equations and real option
theory in investment decision problems in a continuous-time framework. In the real
world, the future of any investment is uncertain and unexpected situations that
affect the value of an investment can occur without any warning. We use stochastic
differential equations as mathematical models and include uncertainty throughWiener
processes. The dynamics of possible state variables such as stock prices, level of
development, business/project values as well as investment costs are all assumed to
follow diffusion processes.
In Chapter 2, we consider a problem of investment by individual investors in a
stock market. Stock markets are one of the most popular investment markets in the
world. In our stock market model, there are two investors who invest in one risky
asset, called stock, and one riskless asset, called bond. We are interested in how the
market shares of the two investors change with time. We assume that the stock pays
a return continuously in the form of a dividend which follows a geometric Brownian
motion. The bond is assumed to pay a fixed interest rate as a return. We consider
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three different cases of the initial wealth of the two investors. We are not able to
obtain the analytic solution of our model. Instead, in each scenario, we use numerical
simulation to determine the market shares of the investors with respect to different
investment strategies.
In Chapters 3 and 5, we study investment problems associated with the business
of a firm. In this thesis, we use real option theory as a mathematical tool for solving
investment decision problems related to the business of a firm. In contrast to the
classical Net-Present Value (NPV) method, that is usually used to decide whether
or not a firm should take an action, the real option theory approach includes three
important major characteristics of investment problems, namely irreversiblity, future
uncertainty and timing. This is the reason why we use the real option theory approach
to find optimal times for the firm to take actions such as adopting the business/project,
extending the business or stopping the investment.
We concentrate on investment problems associated with investment of a firm in
privatised businesses. Investing in privatised businesses can be attractive for private
companies. The governments of many countries have adopted privatisation as part of
their development plans. Further, if a country has financial difficulties and requires
assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the IMF often requires from
that country to adopt privatisation plans as part of a rescue package.
We consider two types of privatisation in our investment models. In Chapter 3 we
study concessionary agreements and in Chapter 5 we study partial privatisation.
In several types of businesses and projects, for example, construction of toll high-
ways, building sports arenas, mining, natural gas/oil exploration, governments fre-
quently choose to enter into a concessionary agreement with a private company to
develop and manage the project or business. In Chapter 3, we apply an entry-exit
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model in real option theory to consider the situation where the private company is
looking for the optimal times to enter a concessionary agreement and then to terminate
it prematurely if the costs of continuing are greater than the costs of stopping.
An alternative strategy that a government can use is partial privatisation. In this
case, the government can retain control of a part of the business and sell the remaining
part to private companies. In Chapter 5, we study the situation where the private
company is given an opportunity to invest in a partially privatised business. We aim
to determine the optimal time for the company to adopt the business. In addition,
after the adoption, we aim to compute the optimal dynamic strategy in terms of the
amount of investment within a range [0, k] ; k > 0.
In addition to optimal entry-exit times and optimal investment strategies, the
relationships between parameters and the expected values are interesting. The re-
lationships are examined via Monte Carlo simulation. In the case that the private
company develops a project under a concessionary agreement, we investigate the
relationship between the uncertainty of the level of development and the expected time
that the company develops the business, i.e. the expected time that the concessionary
agreement is active. On the other hand, in the situation that the private company
invests in a partially privatised business, we study the relationship between the
proportion of ownership the private company holds in the privatised business and the
expected utility of the government. The investigations of these relationships are also
advantageous for the government. The government could use the results for planning
its privatisation policies. For instance, a government could use the results from the
concessionary agreement case to set a suitable period of time for the concession, or the
penalty if the company breaks the concessionary contract. The results for the partial
privatisation case could help the government in setting the appropriate proportions
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of ownership to retain itself and to sell to the private company.
The main objectives of Chapters 2, 3 and 5 are to study particular investment
problems. The main objective of Chapter 4 is different as its aim is to introduce
numerical methods that can be used to solve stochastic optimal control problems
involving linear controls. In such problems, the classical numerical methods like
Finite Difference or finite state Markov chain approximation do not work well. The
reason is that for linear control problems the optimal strategy switches between
maximum and minimum values of the control. This results in the corresponding
Bellman equation being broken down into two differential equations which are linked
at the optimal threshold for switching. The method we introduce is based on the
idea of solving a two-point boundary value problem by spline functions. That is,
we use piecewise-polynomials to interpolate the solution of the problem. Generally,
quadratic polynomials are used to approximate the value function in problems of this
type because the function and its derivative are continuous. The continuity of the
derivative leads to the smooth pasting condition, which is the condition that the first
derivatives of the value function below and above the threshold must have the same
values at the threshold. However, we show that in some cases, we can additionally
impose continuity of the second derivative and then the second derivatives below
and above the threshold must be equal at the threshold. This condition allows us
to approximate the solution of the differential equations by using piecewise cubic
polynomials. In Chapter 5, we show an application of this numerical method in
solving the problem of investment in a privatised business.
One of the main mathematical tools that we apply in this thesis is the real option
theory approach. This approach has been popular in the past decades for determining
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optimal times for taking actions in many different areas. Even though the early
applications of real option theory were involved with irreversible investment problems
in non-renewable resource such as coal, oil, etc., it has recently been applied in many
other areas. One example is shown in this thesis where we have discussed applications
to investment decision problems.
Another interesting area that real option theory is frequently applied to is envi-
ronmental economics, especially anti-pollution problems. As stated in Hettige et al.
(1996) [36], in many developing countries, particularly those in Asia, formal regulation
on industrial pollution is usually weak, perhaps due to the absence of clear and legally
binding regulations as well as limited institutional capacity. This leads to a large
numbers of firms in such countries engaging in pollution-intensive production. When
communities are affected by the pollution, they can try to force those firms to reduce
the pollution as in the following examples.
In October 1992, there was a local protest in Lampang province, northern part of
Thailand, regarding the industrial pollution caused by sulphurous dust emitted from
the Mae Moh power plant which uses lignite as fuel. The plants and livestock in
more than 40 villages in Lampang were affected by the yellow sulphurous dust and
acid rain. The sulphurous dust also had an impact on human’s health through the
development of pneumoconiosis, a disease of the lungs caused by breathing in dust
(see [31] and [85]). Another example of a pollution protest was located in central
China. According to Reuters and AFP (see [84] and [83]), in July 2009, more than
1,000 people protested over pollution caused by emission of cadmium from Xianghe
chemical plant. Two villagers near the plant died in May and June. They were found
to have high levels of cadmium in their bodies. Moreover, over 500 out of nearly 3,000
local residents had elevated levels of cadmium in their urine. There have also been
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many other anti-pollution protests around the world.
The environmental issue is an important problem nowadays. The real option
theory approach can be applied to environmental problems; for instance, in answering
questions regarding optimal times for installing anti-pollution abatement facilities.
Furthermore, using substitute energy is another choice for reducing pollution. Substi-
tute energies such as biodiesel and nuclear power have been developed for many years
in many countries. Once again, the optimal time for adopting a new technology can
be approached by applying real option theory.
In this thesis, we assume that state equations are of diffusion type and that uncer-
tainty is driven by Wiener processes. Sometimes, the diffusion process is inadequate
in the modelling. For example, it has been found that in some situations a geometric
Brownian motion is not a good choice for modelling the behaviour of stock prices
(see Bates(1991) [6], etc.). In the real world, there might be infrequently unexpected
events such as market crashes which result in a sudden drop in stock prices. One
suggestion for making models more realistic is to employ jump-diffusion processes to
describe the state variables. In a jump-diffusion process (see equation (6.1)) there
are two uncertainties, namely the Wiener process, W (t), and a Poisson process, P (t),
which capture two types of unpredictable events. The Wiener process goes on all the
time while the Poisson process occurs infrequently.
dx(t) = α(t, x(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t) + J(t, x(t))dP (t) ; x(0) = x0 (6.1)
In addition, the models we use in this thesis are theoretical models and the pa-
rameter values are chosen arbitrarily to illustrate the behaviour expected from the
models. In the literature, geometric Brownian motion and geometric mean reversion
processes are often used in describing the dynamics of state variables because of
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mathematical tractability. However, it has been argued by influential authors in the
economic literature (see [23], for example), that describing a state variable such as
project’s value by geometric Brownian motion, though convenient and mathematically
easy to handle, is somehow unrealistic. That is because geometric Brownian motion
is unbounded in expectation and variance. According to basic microeconomic theory,
in the long run the price of a commodity should be tied to its long-run marginal cost.
This feature does not exist in a geometric Brownian motion model, but it does in so-
called mean reverting models. This suggests that using a geometric mean reversion
process to describe the dynamics of project’s value makes more sense. However, if
x = 0 is taken as a fixed point of the geometric mean reversion process (and also
geometric Brownian motion), which we have interpreted as the company is bankrupt,
then this choice does not seem to be economically reasonable in some cases. For
example, the projects that are important to the country, such as electricity or water
supply, etc., cannot be allowed to die out even through the company managing it is
unsuccessful, i.e. if its value falls to zero. Because the project is essential for the
residents, the government might have to subsidise that project or impose policies to
ensure that it recovers. In such cases, a CIR process, equation (6.2) might be a better
choice that can be used in the modelling.
dx(t) = κ (θ − x(t)) dt+ σ
√
x(t)dW (t) (6.2)
The CIR process has been introduced by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross [18] and has been
studied in great detail in the context of interest rate models and stochastic volatility
models in finance. The process is a kind of mean reversion process but does not have
the property of a fixed point at x = 0. That is if the value of x goes to zero, it
would not remain there but recovers. Another interesting extension of the models in
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this thesis is that one could think of using empirical data in order to estimate the
appropriate values of parameters as in the works of Wiggins (1987) [75] for example.
In [75], the author used the daily-return data of eight stocks; AT&T, Beatrice, Ford,
IT&T, IBM, Mobil, Sears, and Union Carbide, over the July 1962-December 1984
period to derive statistical estimators for volatility process parameters.
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